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A PROPOSAL FOR A WHOLESALE REFORM
OF CALIFORNIA'S SENTENCING
PRACTICE AND POLICY
Primary Drafters Michael Vitiello * and Clark Kelso **
Contributors to this report: Erwin Chemerinsky, Kevin Reitz,
Jonathan Turley and Franklin E. Zimring
In the spring of 2003, the primary drafters of this report began
organizing a conference to mark ten years of experience with
California's Three Strikes law.' Ultimately, we invited a select
group of scholars to come together to discuss ideas for reform. This
* Professor of Law, University of Pacific's McGeorge School of Law.
J.D., University of Pennsylvania; B.A. Swarthmore College. The authors
thank Dean Elizabeth Rindskopf-Parker and the McGeorge School of Law for
their generous support of the program that we conducted at McGeorge in April,
2004, entitled Sentencing Policy and Practice: Dollars and Sense. We also
wish to thank our research assistants Jennifer L. Cecil and Rachel A. Julagay
for their excellent work in helping us prepare this report for publication.
* * Professor of Law and Director, Capital Center for Government Law and
Policy, University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law. J.D., Columbia
University School of Law; B.A., University of Illinois. Professor Kelso also
serves in Governor Schwarzenegger's administration as the Chief Information
Officer for the State of California. However, the views expressed in this article
are entirely Professor Kelso's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Schwarzenegger administration.
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667, 1170.12 (West 2002 & Supp. 2003).
2. Our speakers included Erwin Chemerinsky, Kevin Reitz, Jonathan
Turley, and Franklin E. Zimring.
Erwin Chemerinsky is the Alston & Bird Professor of Law at Duke
University School of Law. From 1983 to 2004, Chemerinsky taught at the
University of Southern California School of Law, where he was the Sydney M.
Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and Political Science.
Chemerinsky has testified before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, the
California Senate Judiciary Committee, and the California Assembly
Committee on the Judiciary. Chemerinsky has also been a frequent consultant
for media sources. He has represented and written briefs for many defendants
eligible for sentencing under California's Three Strikes law, recently before the
U.S. Supreme Court in Lockyer v. Andrade. His regular column discussing the
Supreme Court appears in Trial Magazine, California Lawyer, and the Los
Angeles Daily Journal. From 1998 to 2003, the Daily Journal has included
Chemerinsky in their list of the 100 most influential lawyers in California.
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Article is a result of that conference. There has already been a robust
debate about the law's effectiveness and wisdom. 3 The great weight
Additionally, Chemerinsky has authored four books, over 100 law review
articles and hundreds of essays appearing in magazines and newspapers.
Kevin Reitz has been a professor of law at the University of Colorado,
Boulder Law School since 1988. In 1993, Reitz organized the pilot meeting
for the National Association of Sentencing Commissions (NASC), which has
since developed into a resource for states across the nation considering
sentencing reform. Reitz continues to work with NASC as well as individual
sentencing commissions. From 1989 to 1994, Reitz worked as co-reporter for
the new edition of the ABA's Criminal Justice Standards for Sentencing. Reitz
has also served on Colorado General Assembly Subcommittees dealing with
sentencing and community sanctions issues. In 2001, the American Law
Institute appointed Reitz to serve as reporter for the first revision of the Model
Penal Code, a project addressing only the Code's sentencing and corrections
provisions. He has prepared extensive materials in his capacity as a reporter.
Reitz wrote The Challenge of Crime: Rethinking Our Response in 2003 (with
co-author Henry Ruth), for which he won the National Council on Crime and
Delinquency's "Prevention for a Safer Society" (PASS) award.
Jonathan Turley began his legal teaching career at Tulane Law School
and then joined the George Washington Law School faculty in 1990, where he
is the J.B. and Maurice Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law. He teaches
courses in constitutional law, constitutional criminal law, environmental law,
litigation, and torts. Turley has appeared as a witness before the House and the
Senate numerous times on constitutional and statutory issues. He founded and
is the executive director of the Project for Older Prisoners (POPS), a volunteer
program intended to offset prison overcrowding and provide assistance to
geriatric prisoners, with programs now at law schools in several states. For a
more detailed discussion, see infra note 253. He is also the director of George
Washington Law School's Environmental Law Advocacy Institute.
Franklin E. Zimring directed the Center for Studies in Criminal Justice
at the University of Chicago from 1973 to 1985. While there, Zimring held the
Llewellyn Chair in jurisprudence. In 1985, he came to the University of
California at Berkeley as the Director of the Earl Warren Legal Institute and its
program for criminal justice. Zimring teaches family and criminal law at Boalt
Hall, and also teaches in the Jurisprudence and Social Policy Doctorate
program, Berkeley's Law and Society doctoral program. Zimring has served
on the National Academy of Science Panel of Violence as well as the Director
of Research for the Task Force on Violence of the National Commission on the
Causes and Preventions of Violence. Zimring's books include The Changing
Legal World of Adolescence (1982), Capital Punishment and the American
Agenda (with Gordon Hawkins) (1987), The Scale of Imprisonment (1991),
The Search for Rational Drug Control (1992), and, most recently, Punishment
and Democracy: Three Strikes and You're Out in California (with Gordon
Hawkins and Sam Kamin) (2001).
3. See, e.g., Symposium, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 4 (1999) (examining
the debate between politicians and academics regarding the impact of
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of empirical studies discounts the role of Three Strikes in reducing
crime.4 Instead, Three Strikes adds to the prison population5 but, in
sentencing laws such as Three Strikes on crime rates and rates of
incarceration); Symposium, A Fork in the Road, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 285, 540
(1998) (proposing that elected officials review "three strikes" laws and "truth
in sentencing" laws); Symposium, Three Strikes and You're Out Legislation,
26 UWLA L. REV. 239 (1995). For an exchange on the effectiveness of the
Three Strikes law and the metfiodologies used in measuring its success, see
Brian P. Janiskee & Edward J. Erler, Crime, Punishment, and Romero: An
Analysis of the Case Against California 's Three Strikes Law, 39 DUQ. L. REV.
43 (2000) [hereinafter Janiskee & Erler, Three Strikes Analysis]; Franklin E.
Zimring & Sam Kamin, Rebuttal: Facts, Fallacies, and California's Three
Strikes, 40 DuQ. L. REV. 605 (2002); Michael Vitiello, Rebuttal: Somewhat
Frantic; A Brief Response to Crime, Punishment, and Romero, 40 DUQ. L.
REV. 615 (2002); Brian P. Janiskee & Edward J. Erler, Rebuttal: California 's
Three Strikes Law: Symbol and Substance, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 173 (2002)
[hereinafter Janiskee & Erler, Rebuttal].
4. See, e.g., DARYL A. HELLMAN & NEIL 0. ALPER, ECONOMICS OF CRIME
9-10 (4th ed. 1997) (noting that differences in crime rates may not be due to
the Three Strikes law, but instead to changes in the number of agencies
reporting such crimes or the willingness of victims to report offenses to
police); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRNG ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY 101
(2001) (stating the "decline in crime observed after the effective date of the
Three Strikes law was not the result of the statute"); Linda S. Beres & Thomas
Griffith, Did "Three Strikes" Cause the Recent Drop in California Crime? An
Analysis of the California Attorney General's Report, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
101, 102 (1998) [hereinafter Beres & Griffith, Analysis of AG's Report]
(concluding "there is no evidence that Three Strikes played an important role
in the drop in the crime rate"); Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Do Three
Strikes Laws Make Sense? Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal
Incapacitation, 87 GEO. L.J. 103, 138 (1998) (finding that "[b]ecause most
high-rate offenders are already imprisoned for most of their criminal careers,
only a modest reduction in crime can be achieved by incarcerating them for
longer terms"); Mike Males & Dan Macallair, Striking Out: The Failure of
California 's "Three Strikes and You're Out" Law, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
65, 67 (2000) (finding that the "counties that vigorously and strictly enforce
the Three Strikes law did not experience a decline in any crime category
relative to more lenient counties"); David Schultz, No Joy in Mudville Tonight:
The Impact of "Three Strike" Laws on State and Federal Corrections Policy,
Resources, and Crime Control, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 557 (2000)
(offering alternative explanations for the mid to late 1990's crime rate drop);
see also Michael Vitiello, California's Three Strikes and We're Out: Was
Judicial Activism California's Best Hope?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1025,
1081-96 (2004) [hereinafter Vitiello, Judicial Activism] (reviewing numerous
empirical studies on the Three Strikes law and its relationship to the crime
rate).
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light of other sentencing provisions, does little to add to social
protection.
6
5. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 135-38 (describing the long-term
impact of Three Strikes on the prison population).
6. See id. at 105 (finding that Three Strikes has a minimal impact on crime
in California).
An occasional study claiming that Three Strikes is responsible for the
sharp decline in crime rates in California has gained wide publicity. In 1998,
for example, then Attorney General Dan Lungren published such a report.
Office of the Atty. Gen., Cal. Dep't of Justice, "Three Strikes and You're Out"
(1998) [hereinafter AG's Report] (discussing the impact on the criminal justice
system after four years), available at http://www.threestrikes.org/
cag98_pgone.html. As more scholarly studies demonstrate, the AG's report
lumped together crime data from several years before passage of Three Strikes
in order to support its claim that Three Strikes was responsible for the decline
in crime in the mid- 1990's. But the decline had begun shortly before passage
of Three Strikes and continued to decline at about the same rate after its
passage. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 88; Beres & Griffith, Analysis of
AG"s Report, supra note 4, at 107-08.
To mark the tenth anniversary of the law, Mike Reynolds, the father of
the murder victim and the driving force behind the passage of Three Strikes,
and Bill Jones, one of the early sponsors of the Three Strikes statute when he
served in the legislature, published a report claiming that Three Strikes has
saved California over $28 billion. Cal. Dep't of Justice & Cal. Dep't of
Corrections, 3-Strikes 1994 to 2004, A Decade of Difference (Mar. 7, 2004),
available at http://www.threestrikes.org/tenyearstudy_pgl.html. But this new
study shares the methodological flaws of earlier empirical reports that claim
that Three Strikes is responsible for the down turn in crime rates. Page one of
the new report demonstrates the major flaw in its methodology: it compares ten
years before Three Strikes with the ten years after Three Strikes. Id. That
allows its proponents to ignore the fact that prior to passage of Three Strikes,
crime rates had begun to decline and that the rate of decline continued at the
same pace after its passage.
The report ignores other problems with the data: for example, Three
Strikes proponents claim that the law reduces crime by incarcerating high rate
offenders. James A. Ardaiz, California's Three Strikes Law: History,
Expectations, Consequences, 32 McGEORGE L. REv. 1, 31 (2000); Bill Jones,
Why the Three Strikes Law is Working in California, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REv. 23, 24 (1999). But even before Three Strikes, California had spent the
previous decade increasing criminal sentences dramatically. See, e.g., CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11370.2 (West 2004) (enacted in 1985 and
providing a three-year enhancement for defendants with specific prior drug
convictions who suffer new convictions for specific drug offenses); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 667.7 (West 2004) (imposing a sentence of twenty-years-to-life
for those who have served two prior prison terms for specified violent offenses
when the current conviction is for a felony with the intent to inflict great bodily
injury, and life without the possibility of parole for those with three prior
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We found only scant scholarly research to support the claim that
Three Strikes caused the downturn in California's crime 
rates. 7
Those few reports that claim Three Strikes is responsible for the
downturn in crime rates have serious methodological flaws.8 We
found even less theoretical support for the law among legal scholars.
9
Despite the absence of scholarly support for the law, its
proponents have successfully promulgated a legend about the law.
As noted by the authors of Punishment and Democracy: Three
Strikes and You're Out in California, many believe that Three
Strikes represents a "watershed" change in penal policy from soft to
hard on crime, leading to the downturn in crime.' 0 Proponents
prison terms); id. § 667.51 (providing a five-year enhancement for defendants
with one prior conviction of a lewd act with a child, and fifteen-years-to-life
for defendants with two prior convictions, who suffer the same as the current
offense); id. § 667(a) (providing a five-year enhancement for defendants with
prior serious felony convictions); Markus Dirk Dubber, Note, The
Unprincipled Punishment of Repeat Offenders: A Critique of California's
Habitual Criminal Statute, 43 STAN. L. REV. 193, 197-98 (1990) (detailing the
history of the enactment of section 667(a) and noting that Proposition 8, passed
by voters in 1982, established much harsher penalties for repeat offenders). If
incarceration caused sharp declines in crime, we should have experienced the
drop in crime even before three strikes. Instead, the data did not show any
consistent pattern of decline. Franklin E. Zinring, The Voodoo Economics of
California Crime, OVERCROWDED TIMES, Oct. 1994, at 3.
7. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent
Effect of California 's Two-and Three-Strikes Legislation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
159 (2002) (arguing that Three Strikes has deterred a significant amount of
crime). For a rebuttal of that study, however, see Vitiello, Judicial Activism,
supra note 4, at 1090-96.
8. Such reports include Jones, supra note 6, and AG's Report, supra note
8. Those reports also fail to explain why other states, like New York and
Massachusetts, that did not enact three strikes laws during the 1990's when
about half of all states did so, nonetheless experienced reductions in crime
equivalent to California's lowered crime rates. Vitiello, Judicial Activism,
supra note 4, at 1084.
9. Some of the public officials who supported Three Strikes have written
articles in support of the law. See Jones, supra note 6; Ardaiz, supra note 6;
Phil Wyman & John G. Schmidt, Jr., Three Strikes You're Out (It's About
Time), 26 UWLA L. REV. 249 (1995). We could not find support for the law
among legal scholars. Two political scientists have written in support of the
law. See Janiskee & Erler, Three Strikes Analysis, supra note 3; Janiskee &
Erler, Rebuttal, supra note 3.
10. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 221.
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continue to promote that legend despite compelling evidence to the
contrary." Ardent belief has prevailed over empirical analysis.
In Punishment and Democracy, Professor Frank Zimring and his
co-authors lament the decline of empiricism and expert influence in
formulating criminal justice policy. 12  After offering examples of
involvement of criminal law professors in formation of criminal
justice policy, including their role in the singular accomplishment of
drafting the Model Penal Code, Punishment and Democracy
observed that the influence and involvement of experts in the process
have declined:
[T]here is now a large gap between law professors and the
legislative process, and not just in California .... Part of
the problem is that most academic lawyers are not much
interested in criminal justice policy processes. Most of the
problem is that there is no demand for what experts have to
offer, which is information about the implications and
consequences of policy choices.'
3
The trade winds may now be shifting in favor of a more
dispassionate and empirically grounded discussion of sentencing
policy in California. Consider the following changes in the
environment: First, California's budget woes provide an opportunity
to reexamine policies that have led to dramatic prison increases.
14
The California budget has few areas of discretionary spending.
15
Further, the prison budget is the one budget item that has undergone
11. Compare Jones, supra note 6, at 24-25 (attributing California's decline
in crime rate to Three Strikes), with Vitiello, Judicial Activism, supra note 4, at
1081-96 (discussing a host of empirical studies finding that either Three
Strikes did not cause all or most of the decline in the crime rate, or demanding
a greater causal link between Three Strikes and the decline).
12. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 13.
13. Id.
14. See Mark Martin, Prison Budget Up, Despite No Raise, S.F. CHRON.,
May 14, 2004, at A 15 (discussing the "budget crunch," including a proposal to
eliminate some prison meals on weekends and holidays, as well as a request by
Governor Schwarzenegger that the California Correctional Peace Officers
Association "give up $300 million in salaries and benefits").
15. Robert Salladay, Governor's Tough Task: Finding the Waste to Cut,
S.F. CHRON., Nov. 27, 2003, at Al; George Skelton, Millions of Micro-
Managers Share Blame for State's Crises, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2003, at B8.
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little scrutiny.16 Budget discussions have a way of separating facts
about dollars and cents from fiction.
Second, United States Supreme Court Justice Anthony
Kennedy's speech to the American Bar Association was a national
call to action. 17  He argued that Americans spend too much on
prisons and that "our punishments [are] too severe [and] our
sentences [are] too long." E8 He recommended that federal sentencing
guidelines be revised downward and criticized the necessity for and
the justice in mandatory minimum sentences. 19 Not only did he call
for lowering sentences and for greater sentencing discretion for
judges, but he also advocated the reinvigoration of pardon and
clemency processes.
20
The ABA responded to Justice Kennedy's challenge by
establishing a commission to hold hearings around 
the country.21
The Commission was charged with the responsibility to examine
issues relating to mandatory minimum sentences, sentencing
16. See, e.g., Mark Martin, Prison Guards Open to Cutting Pay, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 5, 2004, at A23 (discussing the lack of scrutiny that resulted in
wasteful spending under the prison guards' labor contract); Jeffrey L. Rabin,
Corrections' 1,000 Hires Shock Senators, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004, at B 10
(noting that "prison officials.., had hired an extra 1,000 employees-mostly
prison guards-without authorization or funding"); Corrections Independent
Review Panel, Introduction to Reforming California's Youth and Adult
Correctional System, (June 2004) [hereinafter Deukmejian Report] (noting the
"out-of-control costs" of California's correctional system), available at
http://www.cpr.ca.gov/reports/indrpt/corr/index.htm.
17. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Keynote Address at
the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003) [hereinafter
Kennedy Speech], available at http://www.abanet.org/media/kencomm/
amkspeech03.html.
18. Id.
19. Id. No doubt, Justice Kennedy had in mind California's Three Strikes
legislation when he criticized mandatory minimum sentences. See id. While
he joined the majority in rejecting a constitutional challenge to the defendant's
twenty-five-years-to-life sentence in Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003),
no doubt he would argue that reforming criminal sentences is the legislature's
responsibility, not the Court's.
20. Kennedy Speech, supra note 17, available at http://www.abanet.org/
media/kencomm/amkspeech03.html.
21. Press Release, American Bar Association, California Officials to
Discuss Prison Conditions, Sentencing and Rehabilitation Issues with
American Bar Association Commission (Apr. 2, 2004), at
http://www.abanews.org/releases/news04O 2O4 .htnl.
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guidelines, and judicial sentencing discretion.22  The ABA also
charged the Commission with assessing prisons, the pardon process,
and related issues.23 Thus, after decades of increasing prison
populations, longer prison sentences, reduced sentencing discretion,
and abandonment of rehabilitative programs, prominent members of
the legal community have questioned the punitive attitudes that have
led to draconian sanctions.
24
On June 23, 2004, the Kennedy Commission submitted its report
to the House of Delegates of the ABA for action at its August 2004
meeting. Its recommendations are encouraging and are similar to
some of the reforms advocated by participants in our conference.2 6
Its recommendations are guided by two primary principles:
22. Press Release, American Bar Association, Incoming ABA President
Dennis W. Archer Calls on Lawyers to Evaluate Nation's Prison
and Corrections System (Aug. 11, 2003), at http://www.abanews.org/
aug03/081103_3.html.
23. Press Release, American Bar Association, ABA Forms New
Commission to Review Mandatory Minimum Sentences, Prison Conditions
and Pardons (Oct. 6, 2003), at http://www.abanet.org/media/oct03/
100603 _.html.
24. See also Little Hoover Commission, Back to the Community: Safe &
Sound Parole Policies (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/
lhcdir/172/reportl72.pdf. The Little Hoover Commission concluded that
California's parole program is an extraordinarily expensive failure which,
despite large expenditures, fails to adequately protect public safety. The report
notes the lack of accountability within the system and notes the need for proper
evaluation of current programs. The report further observes that California's
narrow focus on punishment has led the system to release inmates ill-prepared
to assume productive and safe roles in the community, and has created a
system too reliant on incarceration, the most costly alternative in a spectrum of
possibilities for parole violators. The report offers specific, concrete
suggestions on how to carry out its recommendations at all necessary levels:
state correctional, local law enforcement, community-based programs,
legislative support, and with the parolees themselves. Recurrent notions, such
as cost-effective alternatives to incarceration for parole violators, the use of
individual risk assessment to create programs tailored to individual parolees, as
well as repeated evaluation of the system as a whole, run throughout its
recommendations, aimed toward creating a more comprehensive and effective
parole system.
25. AM. BAR ASS'N, JUSTICE KENNEDY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2004) [hereinafter KENNEDY REPORT],
http://www.abanet.org/media/kencomm/rep121a.pdf.
26. For example, the Kennedy Commission's recommendation to repeal
mandatory minimum sentence statutes mirrors the reforms of the three strikes
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(1) Lengthy periods of incarceration should be reserved for
offenders who pose the greatest danger to the community
and who commit the most serious offenses.
(2) Alternatives to incarceration should be provided when
offenders pose minimal risk to the community and appear
likely to benefit from rehabilitation efforts.
27
Its specific recommendations include an exhortation that states,
territories, and the federal government repeal mandatory minimum
sentence statutes; adopt sentencing systems that guide judicial
discretion to avoid disparities in sentencing among offenders and
offenses while permitting them to consider unique characteristics of
offenses and offenders; 28 require courts to state their reasons for
particular sentences and allow appellate review; 29 and create an
entity charged with the responsibility for monitoring the sentencing
system, with an eye towards recommending alternatives to
incarceration for some offenders and assessing the financial impact
of proposed legislation and the impact of such legislation on racial
disparity and crime rates.
30
law suggested in our conference, infra note 286. Another of our suggested
reforms includes establishing a blue ribbon commission on sentencing. A
sentencing commission could provide guidance, yet still allow circumstance-
based discretion. This proves consistent with the Kennedy Commission
recommendation of using sentencing systems guided with judicial discretion,
but also allowed to consider circumstances related to individual offenders and
offenses. Furthermore, our proposed reform would also support the
assignment of "an entity or agency with sufficient authority and resources" to
monitor the sentencing system in a jurisdiction. KENNEDY REPORT, supra note
25, at 31, available at http://www.abanet.org/media/kencomn/repl21a.pdf.
The discussion in this report of the success of various state sentencing
commissions, infra notes 306, 312-345 and accompanying text, demonstrates
that a sentencing commission can serve that function. We also propose that the
experts of a blue ribbon commission be familiar with punishment alternatives
to incarceration, consistent with the Kennedy Commission recommendation
that treatment alternatives to incarceration be both studied and funded.
27. KENNEDY REPORT, supra note 25, at 1, available at http://www
.abanet.org/media/kencomm/repl 21 a.pdf.
28. Id. at 27.
29. Id. at 30.
30. Id. at31.
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Justice Kennedy immediately endorsed the commission's
recommendations. 31  The ABA's adoption of the commission's
recommendations should go a long way towards putting sentencing
and parole policy on the agenda in the near future.
Third, the recall of Governor Gray Davis and the election of
Arnold Schwarzenegger created a mechanism for change in state re-
sentencing policy. 32  Governor Davis counted on the support of
California's most influential union, the California Corrections and
Peace Officers Association. 33 Its influence was so great that even
faced with a severe budget shortfall, Governor Davis agreed to a pay
increase for members of the union. 34 Since his election, Governor
Schwarzenegger has shown a willingness to challenge the union.
Further, his appointment of Roderick Hickman to head the troubled
California Youth and Adult Correctional Agency has received high
31. Ann Gearan, Associated Press, ABA: End Mandatory Minimum Prison
Terms, (June 23, 2004), available at http://apnews.myway.com/article/
20040623/D83CQ5ROO.html.
32. Michael Finnegan, The Recall Election: Gov. Davis is Recalled;
Schwarzenegger Wins; I Will Not Fail You,' The Republican Victor Promises,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2003, at Al.
33. Fox Butterfield, California's Prison System Blasted as $1 Billion
Failure, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 16, 2003, at 12; Patt Morrison, Union Knows
All About Crime, but Nothing About Punishment, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2004, at
B3 (discussing the millions of dollars the Union contributed to the Davis
campaign); see also Inst. of Governmental Studies, Univ. of Cal., California
Correctional Peace Officers Association (June 2004) [hereinafter Cal.,
CCPOA] (discussing the Union's power and influence), available at
http://www.igs.berkeley.edu/library/htCalifomiaPrisonUnion.htm.
34. Gregg Jones, Union Backs Off on Talks Over Pay Concessions, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2003, at B8 (reporting that the legislature approved a contract
between Governor Davis and California's prison guards union that will
increase guards' pay by as much as 37% over the next five years); see also Dan
Morain, Overtime Pays Off at Prisons, Some Guards Make More Than
$100, 000 a Year, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2003, at Al (noting swelling overtime
costs after Davis and the legislature approved a more lenient sick leave policy
for prison guards; also observing that the union gave Davis $1.4 million during
his first term); Steve Schmidt, Governor Proposes More Cash for Prisons,
Lawmakers Question $40 Million Increase, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Jan. 28,
2003, at Al (discussing Governor Davis' plans to take money away from
nearly every department but the Department of Corrections to address the
budget deficit, noting that some critics "label it a classic example of political
muscle" as the prison guards union generously contributed to Davis's
campaign).
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marks.35  The appointment of Hickman, a Democrat and veteran
staffer of the agency, surprised many observers and suggests that the
Governor is willing to engage in meaningful change. 36 Finally, he
has already appointed a blue ribbon commission "to expedite
fundamental reform within California's youth and adult correctional
systems." 37 Headed by former Governor George Deukmejian, this
commission, the Independent Review Panel, received a broad
mandate.
38
The Deukmejian commission's report is good news. While
many of its proposals are beyond the scope of our inquiry, some of
them overlap with ours. In fact, members of the commission
attended our conference and specifically cite participant Jonathan
Turley's recommendations in its report.39 The Report endorses the
Project for Older Prisoners Program (POPS). 40 It also recommends a
number of other significant reforms, such as shifting resources from
warehousing offenders in prisons4 1 to more intensive parole
supervision and community-based sanctions, including in-home
detention and close monitoring, and increased use of drug treatment,
35. Gary Delsohn, Surprise Choice For Top Prisons Post; Roderick
Hickman's a Veteran Staffer in the Troubled Agency, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov.
16, 2003, at A3; Jennifer Warren, The State Senate Committee Backs 2 Top
Corrections Appointees; The Panel's Action All But Assures Their
Confirmation to Run the State's Troubled System, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2004,
at B6; Reform Prison System, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Mar. 22, 2004, at F4
(calling Schwarzenegger's appointment of Hickman "a good first step").
36. Delsohn, supra note 35 (calling the appointment a "move that could
signal a housecleaning of top state corrections officials" and noting that Don
Novey, retired head of the prison guards union, "called the appointment 'bold'
and 'a surprise"'); Don Thompson, New Prisons Chief Denies Union Influence,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 13, 2004 (noting Hickman's move towards
change in the prison system by his promise of a "zero tolerance" policy for the
code of silence that existed among prison guards).
37. Press Release, Governor Schwarzenegger Announces Governor
Deukmejian Will Lead an Independent Review Panel for Corrections
Reform (Mar. 5, 2004), www.schwarzenegger.com/en/news/uptotheminute/
newsupto en duke reform.asp?sec-news&subsec--uptotheminute.
38. See id.
39. Deukmejian Report, supra note 16, sec. 7, Inmate and Parolee
Population Management, available at http://www.cpr.ca.gov/reports/
indrpt/corr/index.htm.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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education, and rehabilitation for some offenders. 42 The report shares
with our conference the premise that resources are finite and that the
state can save money while achieving the same level of public
safety.43 A reexamination of the Three Strikes law was beyond the
commission's mandate.
44
Fourth, efforts of a number of reform-minded groups led to the
placement of The Three Strikes and Child Protection Act of 2004 on
the November 2004 ballot.45  Early polls projected broad public
support for the initiative that would have significantly narrowed the
scope of Three Strikes.46 That support evaporated in the last two
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. While the Citizens Against Violent Crime (CAVC) drafted the measure,
the group considered comments and suggestions from other organizations
including, People to Amend California's Three Strike Law (PATS),
Californian's To Amend The Three-Strike Law (CATS), Parents For
Treatment and Healing (A NEW PATH), and representatives from the
Riverside, Placerville, Orange County, Sacramento and San Jose chapters of
Families to Amend California's Three Strikes (FACTS). Los Angeles
Community Policing, The Three Strikes and Child Protection Act of 2004:
Citizens Against Violent Crime, at http://www.lacp.org/2004-Articles-
MainiThreeStrikes.Act.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
46. Early polling data suggested that over 60% of likely voters would vote
to amend Three Strikes to limit it to violent felons. Two organizations, FACTS
and CAVC, hired a well established finn, Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin and
Associates, to conduct the survey. From January 4-7, 2002, the firm contacted
650 people likely to vote in the next election; the survey had a margin of error
of 3.8%. The survey asked a series of questions, resulting in some important
findings: about 74% "approve of the specific provision of the [proposed]
initiative that would require mandatory increased sentences only when
convictions are for violent felonies;" 73% disapprove of the current provisions
that can give a third-time non-violent felon a life sentence; about 65% favor
amending the current law. See Memorandum from Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin
& Associates, to Interested Parties (Jan. 14, 2002); https://
www.amend3strikes.org/voters.htm [hereinafter CAVC, Voter Survey];
FACTS, Home Page, available at http://www.factsl.com (last modified Apr.
30, 2004); Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin & Associates, Home Page, available at
http://fmma.com/ (last visited July 12, 2004). Similarly, the passage of
Proposition 36, mandating treatment instead of incarceration for some drug
offenders, suggests that Californians have been leery of wholesale
incarceration as the only response to crime. Proposition 36 is codified at CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 1210, 1210.1 & 3063.1 (West Supp. 2004); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 11999.4-11999.13 (West Supp. 2004).
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weeks prior to the November election, largely because of last minute
advertisements featuring the Governor, which and led to the defeat of
that measure.47 The broad support for the initiative got the attention
of District Attorneys and the Governor, however, and there now
appears to be greater receptivity to considering more modest
proposals to curb some of the excesses of the Three Strikes law.
48
In light of these changed conditions, we have expanded our
focus beyond calling for the reform of Three Strikes. Instead, we are
convinced that California should revamp its criminal sentencing
policy across the board. Reforming Three Strikes in isolation
promises to be difficult for a number of reasons: Three Strikes'
proponents have created a legend that the law is responsible for
reduced crime rates in California.49 Many politicians remain fearful
of being labeled as soft on crime.50 In addition, its reform will
A poll released June 10, 2004, suggested that 76% of the public
supported the initiative. Mark DiCamillo & Mervin Field, The Field Poll,
(Field Research Corp., Released No. 2121, 2004) [hereinafter Field Poll I],
.http://www.field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/RLS
2 121 .pdf. Subsequent
reports, however, indicate that such support may have been the result of
confusion caused by the pollsters' questions to those polled. Dan Walters,
Apparent Flaws Mar Poll That Showed Voters Ready to Dilute 'Three Strikes',
SACRAMENTO BEE, June 25, 2004, at A3. For the Field Poll in more detail, see
infra note 286.
On October 13, 2004, a new Field Poll was released addressing the
concerns about voter confusion. This most recent poll showed that 65% of
likely voters support the proposition amending Three Strikes. See Mark
DiCamillo & Mervin Field, The Field Poll, 2141, Oct. 13, 2004, available at
http://www.amend3strikes.org/downloads/Field%2OPoll&
2 00 ct%2 013th.pdf.
47. See Andy Furillo, Late Infusion of Cash Sank Proposition 66,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 4, 2004, at A3.
48. Id.; Mark Martin, Proposition 66: Efforts to Reform 'Three Strikes'Law
Likely to Be on Ballot Again, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 4, 2004, at B5.
49. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 221.
50. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Commentary: 3 Strikes: Cruel, Unusual and
Unfair, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2003, at B 11 ("[E]lected officials don't want to
appear soft on crime, even when the crime is shoplifting. No politician wants
to be vulnerable to a story of a shoplifter who was released and then committed
a much worse crime."). One unintended and unfortunate consequence of term
limitations may be the lack of political will to reform criminal sentencing laws.
Even members of the legislature from safe districts must weigh political
choices in light of the next highest office that they may seek.
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require either a super-majority of the legislature or an initiative.51
Efforts at reforming Three Strikes have failed over the past decade.
52
Beyond the practical problems of reforming Three Strikes, the
law is part of a larger problem: as one commentator has stated,
California has created "drive by" criminal sentencing, with the
legislature adding sentencing enhancements and other measures in
51. See CAL. PENAL CODE § § 667j, 1170.12 (West 2002 & Supp. 2003); see
also Amend California's 3 Strikes Law, Q & A (explaining that "[a]ny
legislative change would require a 2/3 vote of the legislature and the
Governor's signature. Anyone who is familiar with politics in California
understands that getting a majority of the legislature to agree on anything, let
alone two-thirds of them, is all but impossible"), at http://www.amend3
strikes.com/q&a.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
52. Failed bills include Senate Bill (S.B.) 1517, A.B. 1790, and Assembly
Bill (A.B.) 112. S.B. 1517 specified that certain non-violent felonies would
not result in a sentence enhancement under Three Strikes for the current
conviction. Three Strikes Law-Nature of Current Convictions: Hearing of
S.B. 1517, Before S. Comm. on Pub. Safety Analysis, 2001-2002 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2002). A.B. 1790 required that the current conviction be for a serious or
violent felony in order to qualify for Three Strikes sentence enhancement.
Summary: Hearing of A.B. 1790 Before Assembl. Comm. on Appropriations,
200.1-2002 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002). A.B. 112 was identical to A.B. 1790,
requiring that the current convictions be for serious or violent felonies to
enhance a sentence. Summary: Hearing of A.B. 112 Before Assembl. Comm. on
Pub. Safety, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003). Additionally, former
Governors Wilson and Davis each vetoed legislation calling for further study
of Three Strikes. S.B. 2048 required an examination of the costs and benefits
of the "Three Strikes" law. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, SENATE FLOOR
ANALYSIS OF S.B. 2048 (Cal. Aug. 28, 1998) ("this bill would require the
Legislative Analyst ... to examine the costs and benefits of the "Three
Strikes" law and report their findings to the Legislature ...." Governor Pete
Wilson vetoed this bill. Governor's Veto of S.B. 2048 (Sept. 13, 1998),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/sen/sb._2001-2050/sb_2048_vt
199809. S.B. 873 also required a study on the costs of the "Three Strikes" law.
Study of the "Three Strikes" Law: Hearing on S.B. 873 Before S. Floor on Bill
Analysis, 1999 Reg. Sess. 1-2 (Cal. Sept. 9, 1999). Governor Gray Davis
vetoed this bill. Governor's Veto Message of S.B. 873 (Cal. Oct. 10, 1999),
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/sen/sb_08510900/sb 873 vt 19991010.ht
ml. Most recently, California voters rejected Proposition 66 during the 2004
election.
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reaction to the crisis of the day.53  The result is a Byzantine
sentencing scheme without a coherent penal philosophy.
5 4
We hope this article contributes to a renewed dialogue among
those interested in prison reform generally, those interested in a
rationalization of our sentencing laws, and those interested in
responsible budgetary reform.
II. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
One might ask, in light of sharp decreases in crime over the past
decade, what is wrong with California's sentencing scheme and its
rate of incarceration. Three Strikes is symptomatic of a generation of
dramatic increases in the length of criminal sentences and in the
increase in the state's prison population. The great weight of
empirical evidence concludes that Three Strikes is not the cause of
much, if any, of the decline in crime rates.55 It also comes with a
high price tag, and the costs of warehousing aging felons will rise
dramatically and add little social protection. 56 In addition, the law
lacks coherent principles to guide sentencing decisions.
5 7 Much the
same can be said of California's sentencing policy 
generally. 58
Criminal sentencing in California is without a coherent penal
theory, which is in part a result of multiple layers of criminal
sentencing that have come about over almost thirty years of
legislative changes to sentencing laws. A brief overview of that
history may be helpful:
53. Kevin Reitz, Presentation at Sentencing Practice and Policy: Dollars
and Sense, McGeorge School of Law (Apr. 17, 2004) (on file with author).
54. For a discussion of California's complex sentencing scheme, see infra
notes 77-134 and accompanying text.
55. Supra note 4.
56. California's Aging Prison Population, Hearing Before the S. Select
Comm. on the Cal. Corr. System of the Cal. S. Comm. on Pub. Safety, 2003-
2004 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) [hereinafter Turley Hearing] (written statement
of professor Jonathan Turley, Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law, George
Washington University Law School) (on file with author). For more on
Turley, see supra note 2 and infra note 253.
57. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 123-24.
58. For a more detailed discussion of the incoherency of California's
sentencing policy, see infra notes 77-134 and accompanying text. See
generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION
(1995) (discussing incapacitation and its effectiveness at restraining crime).
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Prior to 1976, California, like much of the nation, provided for
indeterminate sentences for criminal offenders. For example, a judge
might sentence an offender convicted of a second act of indecent
exposure59 to a term of one-day-to-life in prison. Indeterminate
sentencing was justified by the belief that the primary purpose of
punishment was rehabilitation. In effect, an offender was in need of
treatment and the length of the treatment depended on how well the
patient responded to the cure.60
Commentators across a broad political spectrum rejected that
model. Some questioned the morality of rehabilitation. Why, for
example, should a criminal offender be given education not available
to law-abiding citizens?61 Influenced by conscientious objectors,
others questioned the morality of the state attempting to force change
upon an offender.62 Others questioned whether rehabilitation worked
at all.63 Legitimate questions were raised about the potential for
abuse of such a system, with illegitimate factors like race influencing
the release dates of criminal offenders. 64 Additional questions were
raised concerning the lack of proportionality between the underlying
crime and the term of imprisonment. 65 For example, what if a person
needs a long period of incarceration to be deterred from acts of petty
theft or cured of the desire to commit such offenses, while a person
59. 1961 CAL. STAT. 2147, § 7 (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE §
314 (Deering 2004)); In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1972).
60. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER
89-90 (1973); STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 10 (1971) ("Instead of building pride and self-
confidence, [the rehabilitative process] tries to persuade its subjects.., that
they are sick."); see also id. at 40-41.
61. See MICHAEL MOORE, LAW & PSYCHIATRY 234-35 (1984), reprinted
in SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 123-24 (6th ed. 1995); Morris R. Cohen, Moral Aspects of the
Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987, 1012-14 (1940), reprinted in SANFORD H.
KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 124-
25 (6th ed. 1995).
62. See, e.g., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 100-23 (discussing
the repressive functions of the criminal justice system).
63. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL
61-66 (1981).
64. See, e.g., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 71-72.
65. In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 927-39 (Cal. 1972); ANDREW VON HIRSCH,
DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 67-70 (1976).
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committing homicide does not? The system simply tolerated too
much unchecked discretion: judges faced with similar offenders
could and did impose wildly different sentences on the offender.
66
Beyond the courts, correctional authorities had unbridled discretion
to determine release dates.
6 7
By the mid-1970s, a number of states abandoned indeterminate
sentencing. Giving far less prominence to rehabilitation, they
reestablished retribution-and proportionality of punishment-as
primary goals. 68  Operationally, they established determinate
sentences designed to reduce the perceived inequality among
offenders committing the same criminal act.
69
California followed that route. In abandoning indeterminate
sentencing, California stated its goal in no uncertain terms: "The
Legislature finds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for
crime is punishment. This purpose is best served by terms
proportionate to the seriousness of the offense with provision for
uniformity in the sentences of offenders committing the same offense
under similar circumstances." 70  California law provides for
presumptive sentences, reducing the trial court's discretion.71 Rules
of court state that the goals in sentencing are social protection,
punishment, specific and general deterrence, incapacitation,
restitution for victims, and uniformity among sentences. 72 Central to
the 1976 changes is the view that the offense, not the offender,
determines the length of a prison sentence.
73
66. M. FRANKEL, supra note 60, at 103-04.
67. Id.
68. Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated
Review, 87 CAL. L. REv. 943, 979 (1999); Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering
Rehabilitation, 65 TULANE L. REv. 1011, 1027-32 (1991).
69. Kadish, supra note 68, at 981.
70. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 2004).
71. Id. ("The Legislature further finds and declares that the elimination of
disparity and the provision of uniformity of sentences can best be achieved by
determinate sentences fixed by statute in proportion to the seriousness of the
offense as determined by the Legislature to be imposed by the court with
specified discretion.").
72. CAL. R. CT. 4.410.
73. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 114.
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The change from indeterminate to determinate sentencing forced
the legislature to compare different kinds of criminal conduct. 74 For
example, it had to determine whether an offender convicted of
robbery should receive more severe punishment than a burglar
should. That is, presumably, the 1976 reform forced the legislature
to attempt to rationalize criminal sentences.75
The 1976 sentencing law provided for presumptive terms of
imprisonment for various crimes, with a lower, middle, and upper
range. The law requires the court to sentence the offender to the
middle term, unless it finds aggravating or mitigating factors that
militate in favor of the upper or lower sentence.
76
The numerous "drive by" sentencing laws have eroded whatever
coherence was achieved in 1976.77 That is, when the media have
reported particularly heinous crimes or trends in criminal behavior,
78
74. This is not to suggest that determinate sentencing is ideal. One might
debate the wisdom of any single determinate sentence or of determinate
sentencing generally. For example, commentators have debated the focus on
the offense, rather than on all of the circumstances, including the culpability of
the offender. They have questioned whether a sentencing judge should have a
greater role in assessing the appropriate sentence. See, e.g., Keith C. Owens,
Comment, California 's "Three Strikes" Debacle: A Volatile Mixture of Fear,
Vengeance, and Demagoguery Will Unravel The Criminal Justice System and
Bring California to Its Knees, 25 Sw. U. L. REV. 129, 143 (1995).
75. In fact, the legislature took as the basis for its determinate sentences the
average time Served under the indeterminate system. Sheldon Messinger &
Phillip E. Johnson, California 's Determinate Sentencing Statute: History and
Issues, in NAT'L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DETERMINATE SENTENCING: REFORM OR REGRESSION? 13,
13 (Proceeding of the Special Conference on Determinate Sentencing, 1978).
However, the drafters had to make a conscious choice about how to allocate
prison terms.
76. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West 2004).
77. See Little Hoover Commission, Executive Summary: Putting Violence
Behind Bars; Redefining the Role of California's Prisons (Jan. 1994) ("The
goals of the [Determinate Sentencing Act of 1977] included equity,
consistency and simplicity. But the current system, due to inherent flaws in the
original law, changes in public policy and piecemeal revisions, is not working.
The state's tangle of sentencing statutes is so complex even experts make
sentencing errors. It is a system that is inequitable to both victims and
offenders, offering little in the way of certainty and nothing to a sense of
fairness."), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/124es.html.
78. STEVEN R. DONZIGER, THE REAL WAR ON CRIME 69-73 (1996)
(examining the role of the media in shaping criminal justice policy).
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the legislature has often enacted enhancement provisions.7 9 Multiple
enhancement statutes erode the principle articulated in Penal Code
section 1170.
From 1984 to 1991, over 1,000 crime bills passed. Virtually
none of them reduced sentences and many of them imposed sentence
enhancements.8 0 Often, the crime bill was a reaction to the "crime of
the month," a crime that was hyped in the media. For example, in
1987 the legislature enhanced an offender's sentence for a murder
that occurs when the shooter is inside a car. 81 Other legislation has
enhanced sentences for a variety of crimes committed against certain
classes of victims8 2 or committed under specific circumstances.
83
The Little Hoover Commission summarized the state of California's
criminal law relating to sentence enhancements:
79. David R. Ross provided an example in The Clutter in Criminal Law,
CAL. J., Oct. 1, 1995, at 19:
In 1985, lawmakers turned their attention to sentence enhancements
after a pregnant woman from Ventura County was struck in the
abdomen, causing her to abort. The Legislature created a five-year
enhancement for inflicting injury upon a pregnant woman which
results in termination of the pregnancy. [CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.9
(West 2004).] At the time, a three-year enhancement for intentionally
inflicting 'great bodily injury' during the Commission of any felony
already existed. [Id. § 12022.7(a).]
80. RICHARD SIMPSON, CAL. COUNTIES FOUND., JAILHOUSE BLUES: HARD
TIME FOR COUNTY TAXPAYERS; A STUDY OF RISING COSTS OF
INCARCERATION IN CALIFORNIA (1991).
81. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.55 (West 2004).
82. Id. § 422.75(a)-(c) (victimized because of race, color, religion,
nationality, ancestry, gender, disability, or sexual orientation); id. § 667.9(a)
(disabled, elderly, or child victim); id. § 12022.7(c)-(d) (victim seventy years
of age or older, or child under five years of age).
83. Id. § 186.22(b)(1)(A)-(C) (while violating provisions against
participating in a criminal street gang); id. § 289.5(d) (commission of
designated felony sex offense committed after fleeing to California to avoid
prosecution for sex offense in another state); id. § 593a(b) (causing bodily
harm in commission of tree spiking); id. § 667(a)-(b) (kidnapping victim for
purpose of committing sex offense); id. § 12022(a)-(c) (being armed with
firearm, assault weapon or machine gun or personally using a deadly weapon);
id. § 12022.85 (committing sex offense knowingly carrying AIDS virus); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11353.1(a)(l)-(2) (West 2004) (using minor for
drug transactions on grounds of church, playground or near school grounds).
Many other enhancements are based on prior convictions of the same offense.
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A sentence may be enhanced for weapons, injuries inflicted
during the course of crime, extent of monetary loss,
vulnerability of victims, narcotics, gangs, prior convictions,
multiple victims and sex crimes.
For example, a one-year enhancement is added to the
sentence of a second-degree robber if he uses a knife. A
two-year enhancement is added to the sentence of a
defendant who intentionally causes losses of more than
$150,000. The varying enhancements connected with prior
convictions are particularly lengthy and complex.
84
Numerous judges and commentators have questioned the wisdom of
California's sentencing scheme. A state senator has described
California's enhancement provisions as "the most complex and
chaotic provisions in the Penal Code."
85
One appellate court has criticized the state of the law even more
forcibly:
As a sentencing judge wends [sic] his way through the
labyrinthine procedures of section 1170 of the Penal Code
[the Determinate Sentencing Act], he must wonder, as he
utters some of its more esoteric incantations, if, perchance,
the Legislature had not exhumed some long departed
Byzantine scholar to create its seemingly endless and
convoluted complexities. Indeed, in some ways it resembles
the best offerings of those who author bureaucratic
84. Little Hoover Commission, Putting Violence Behind Bars: Redefining
the Role of California's Prisons, (Jan. 1994), available at
http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/124rp.html. If the state proves an enhancement,
the court must impose the middle term unless additional circumstances
mitigate or aggravate the offense. The imposition of the enhancement is
mandatory unless the court strikes the additional term for enhancement. CAL.
R. CT. 4.428(b).
85. See STATE OF CAL., CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, CRIMINAL
SENTENCING: WEAPON AND INJURY ENHANCEMENTS (2001) (tentative
recommendation) (quoting Senator Schiff's statement from the Hearing on
S.B. 1794 Before the S. Comm. on Public Safety 1997-1998 S., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. Apr. 28, 1998)), available at http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/Misc-
Report/TR-CrimSentencing.pdf.
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memoranda, income tax forms, insurance policies or
instructions for the assembly of packaged toys.86
The complexity of the law causes confusion and wastes judicial
resources. Judges resort to worksheets as complicated as IRS
forms.8 7 One company has developed software to guide judges and
criminal attorneys through the law.88  A Judicial Council study
revealed that the most frequent basis of reversal on appeal is a
sentencing error in the trial court8 9 In some instances, prosecutors
fail to charge enhancements properly.90 The failure to seek an
86. Cmty. Release Bd. v. Super. Ct., 154 Cal. Rptr. 383, 384 n.1 (Ct. App.
1979); See also Ross, supra note 79, at 18 (commenting that this statement was
observed "less than two years after the enactment of the Determinate
Sentencing Law .... [and] [s]ince then, that law has continued to become
more complex, and at an alarming rate").
87. CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, supra note 85, at 2 (referring to then-
Senator Bill Lockyer's statements in a September 10, 1990, letter to then-
Governor George Deukmejian), available at http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/Misc-
Report/TR-CrimSentencing.pdf.
88. In response to difficulties experienced by practitioners, a company
called The Placer Group developed computer software called CrimeTime to do
the math for them. Who is Placer Group, What is CrimeTime?, available at
http://www.placergroup.com/pgcompanylnfo.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2004).
As the company's website once put it, "time and accuracy are at a premium in
an overcrowded justice system. Conscientious practitioners require increasing
amounts of time to make sure they 'got it right,' even as California's
sentencing rules grow more complex and the pressures of the court leave less
time available." Users input the relevant attributes of the defendant, and the
program provides sentencing options. It calculates incarceration, fines, and
collateral consequences and prints reports that explain a defendant's exposure.
The program also allows users to play "What if?" to evaluate the consequences
of the options available. The program includes: all California crimes and
enhancements; Three Strikes calculations; One Strike (sex offense)
calculations; probation eligibility; pre-sentence custody credit calculation; jail
and prison credits; fines, fees, and mandatory/optional orders; California
Rehabilitation Center & California Youth Authority eligibility; registration
requirements; lawful sentence checks; immigration consequences; mitigating
and aggravating factors, and proposed dispositions; and offers reports in
English and Spanish. Id. When sentencing law changes, subscribers receive a
new version of the software's updated database.
89. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL. ANN. REP. at 7 (1983) (finding that while
approximately 80% of criminal appeals are upheld, 23% of the cases that are
overturned involve sentencing errors).
90. See, e.g., Bhavna Mistry, Killer Gets 10 Years in Prison; Mistake
Prevents Harsher Sentence; Drunken Driver Receives 10 Years, DAILY NEWS
L.A., Jan. 11, 2000 (describing case where prosecutor failed to file an
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enhancement is not reviewable on appeal and may lead to
disproportionate sentencing between similarly situated defendants.
9 1
Apart from the complexity and inefficiency of the current law,
enhancements may produce unfair results. For example, the law
imposes a longer sentence on a person who commits murder from
within a car.92  One can question whether the law ought to
distinguish between a person committing murder from within a car
and one simply standing outside of the car. That is hardly the only
example of unfairness. Additionally, the law imposes a variety of
sentence enhancements for the use of a gun in the commission of a
crime.93 In most instances, those provisions apply only to the person
using the weapon,94 but the law imposes the enhancement on any
participant in a crime if that participant is a gang member.95 As a
result, co-felons are subject to enhancements if they personally use a
weapon in a crime, or if the state proves gang affiliation.
96
enhancement of fifteen-years-to-life in prison for the crime of gross vehicular
manslaughter, for defendant with one or more specified priors); see CAL.
PENAL CODE § 191.5(d) (West 2004). Because of this oversight, defendant
with eight drunk driving convictions was sentenced to only ten years in prison
for the death he caused. See id. § 191.5(c) ("Except as provided in subdivision
(d), gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison for 4, 6, or 10 years.").
91. CAL. LAw REvISION COMM'N, supra note 85, at 2 n.11 (noting that in
People v. Latimer, 858 P.2d 611 (Cal. 1993), because the prosecutor failed to
plead and prove a kidnapping-for-the-purpose-of-rape enhancement that could
not later be imposed on appeal, and also noting People v. Hernandez, 757 P.2d
1013 (Cal. 1988), which decided that imposing an enhancement that had not
been plead or proved at trial violated due process), available at
http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/Misc-Report/TR-CrimSentencing.pdf.
92. CAL. PENAL Code § 12022.55 (West 2004).
93. Id. § 12022.53
94. Id. § 12022.53(a)-(d).
95. Id. § 12022.53(e)(2).
96. Gang enhancements are frequently used by prosecutors and easily
proven by the expert testimony of peace officers. Expert detectives list the
defendant's criminal history, whether the defendant has "gang" tattoos, and if
the defendant has ever admitted to gang involvement. Dave Myhra, Three to
Enter Pleas in Drive-by Shooting, TRI-VALLEY HERALD, Nov. 22, 2002, at
Local News. Many gang members are "documented" or "validated" based on
such criteria. Once documented, conviction of a felony exposes a defendant to
the gang enhancement. Irene McCormack Jackson, S.D. Police to Target
Violence by Gangs; Department Adds Personnel to Detail as Crime Rises
Sharply, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Oct. 3, 2003, at B1. Many question the
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Frustration with the current system has led some judges to call
for wholesale sentencing reform. They have cited the "mind-
numbing" complexity of the law, a result of "continued legislative
tinkering., 97 One appellate court summed up the concerns about
California's sentencing scheme as follows: "[T]he Legislature can
and should undertake with the help of bench and bar a solid
comprehensive overhaul of the system to help all potential
defendants and the public generally."
98
Three Strikes goes well beyond the Byzantine sentencing
scheme already in place before its passage. Three aspects of the law
demonstrate its incoherence. The first is the flat inconsistency
between the Three Strikes provision and the two strikes 
provision.99
The second is the pervsity of the results of sentencing different third
strike offenders: the law requires a mandatory minimum of twenty-
five years without regard to the culpability of the offender. 00 In that
sense, the law is a status offense. The effect is that a person
convicted of a third felony of possession of marijuana receives the
same twenty-five year true mandatory minimum sentence as does a
accuracy of these lists and the ever-changing standards employed by law
enforcement. Megan Garvey and Richard Winton, The Nation; Tracking of
Gang-Related Crime Falls Short Without Accurate Data, Experts Say Los
Angeles and Other Cities Can't Effectively Stem the Violence, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
24, 2003, at Al. Some fear that existence of such enhancements "tempt law
enforcement officials to label any young man from a tough neighborhood a
gang member." Id. They also voice concern when crimes are treated as "gang-
related" when they may instead arise from drug use or domestic disputes. Id.
97. People v. Reyes, 260 Cal. Rptr. 846, 850 (Ct. App. 1989).
98. See People v. Winslow, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 901, 903-04 (Ct. App. 1995);
see also id. at 903 n. 1. ("We agree with the previously articulated criticism of
the Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976. It is capable of trapping everyone,
even those who profess expertise." (citation omitted)); People v. Sutton, 169
Cal. Rptr. 656, 656 (Ct. App. 1980) (calling sentencing law "a legislative
monstrosity, which is bewildering in its complexity"); Ross, supra note 79, at
20 ("Crimes, enhancements, mandatory sentences and other concepts should be
simplified, easy to find and understand, and easy to apply. A commission could
accomplish this without making substantive changes in current law."); Little
Hoover Commission, supra note 84 (recommending reform of sentencing law,
which has grown too complex and inequitable through constant, uncoordinated
alterations), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/l24rp.html.
99. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(e)(1)-(2), 1170.12(c)(l)-(2) (West 2004).
100. See id. §§ 667(e)(2)(A), 1170.12(c)(2)(A).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:903
violent felon.' 0' The third is the incoherence between the general
penal philosophy reflected in Penal Code section 1170 and the third
strike provisions of the law.1
0 2
The first problem arises when comparing the two strikes and
three strikes provisions of the law. Three Strikes was enacted with
little attention to the two strikes provisions,10 3 but the two strikes
provisions have had a more sweeping effect on lengthening prison
terms than have the three strikes provisions. 1°4 As summarized in
Punishment and Democracy:
[D]efendants with one residential burglary or violent felony
conviction must receive prison terms double those
mandated for the triggering offense and must also serve a
significantly larger fraction of their total sentence prior to
release after good time. The doubling of the nominal
sentence and the increase from 50% to 80% in required time
served effectively triple the penalty for the triggering
offense. 
05
Apart from the wisdom of the two strikes provisions, they are
inconsistent with the penal philosophy of the Three Strikes
provisions of the law. Consistent with section 1170, the two strikes
provisions bear some relationship to punishing an offender for the
underlying conduct. 10 6  While a first time burglar may receive a
shorter term than a burglar convicted of a second burglary, the
enhancement under the two strikes provisions still ties the length of
the sentence to the actor's offense.' 0 7 One can make a plausible
101. Compare People v. Superior Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996)
(third strike sentence of possession of crack), with People v. Cartwright, 46
Cal. Rptr. 2d 351, 357 (Ct. App. 1995) (upholding three strikes sentence of 428
years to life for rape).
102. See infra notes 118-123 and accompanying text.
103. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 169-70.
104. Id. at 137-38.
105. Id. at 17.
106. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e).
107. See id. (enhancing the punishment of the offender for his second strike);
see also id. § 1170.12(c)(1) (voter initiative). Under subsection (e)(1), for an
offender with a prior "serious" or "violent" felony conviction who has a
current felony conviction, one that need not be serious or violent, the term of
imprisonment "shall be twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for
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argument that the second strike penalties are proportional to the
underlying conduct108 or at least bear a direct relationship to the
nature of the offense. This is not so with third strike penalties.
Third strike sentences are, in effect, penalties for one's status as
a multiple offender. An offender is not punished for the current
conduct, but for having two qualifying prior criminal convictions.
10 9
The fact that the statute uses two definitions of what constitutes a
strike exacerbates the problem. First and second strikes must be
serious or violent felonies,"10 but the final strike may be any
felony."' As a result, an offender such as Andrade' 1 2 and the
defendants whose cases have received national attention' 3 receive
long minimum terms for minor felony offenses.
There is nothing inherently wrong or improper in having a two
strikes provision premised on a fundamentally different theory of
sentencing than a three strikes provision. But the stark discontinuity
between these two provisions does suggest a substantial measure of
doctrinal incoherence. Comparing different third strike sentences
demonstrates the second way in which the law is incoherent. Third
the current felony conviction." Id. § 667(e)(1); see also id. § 1170.12(c)(1)
(voter initiative).
108. ZIMRING ETAL.,supra note 4, at 9.
109. People v. Cooper, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106, 110-11 (Ct. App. 1996)
("Under the three strikes law, defendants are punished not just for their current
offense but for their recidivism. Recidivism in the commission of multiple
felonies poses a danger to society justifying the imposition of longer sentences
for subsequent offenses."); Jones, supra note 6, at 23 ("When three-strikers are
finally put away, the punishment is consideration for a career of crime, not just
the final offense.").
110. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(d), 1170.12(b).
111. See id. §§ 667(e)(2)(A), 1 170.12(c)(2)(A).
112. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (upholding two consecutive
twenty-five-year-to-life sentences for stealing videotapes valued under $200).
113. E.g., Crumby Crime: Life Sentence for Cookie Thief 82 A.B.A. J. 12
(1996) (discussing a 25-years-to-life sentence for entering a closed restaurant
and stealing four cookies.); 60 Minutes: The Bicycle Thief (CBS television
broadcast, May 26, 2002) (transcript available from Burrelle's Info. Servs.)
[hereinafter 60 Minutes] (discussing a 25-years-to-life for stealing a $300
bicycle.); Rene Lynch & Anna Cekola, "3 Strikes " Law Causes Juror Unease
in O.C., L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1995, at Al (discussing a life sentence for taking
a $15 cut in a cocaine deal); Eric Slater, Pizza Thief Receives Sentence of 25
Years to Life in Prison, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at B9 (discussing a 25-
years-to-life sentence for stealing a slice of pizza).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:903
strike sentences of twenty-five-years-to-life have an inverse
relationship to the offender's underlying conduct. For example, but
for Three Strikes, a person convicted of rape would receive a
presumptive middle term of six years in prison; if rape were his third
strike, his minimum term of imprisonment would be twenty-five
years, roughly four times greater than his non-Three Strikes
sentence. 1 4  By comparison, a person whose final felony was
burglary would have his minimum sentence increased twenty-five
times his presumptive sentence under the burglary statute.1 1 5 Thus,
the statute is internally incoherent, with second strike penalties
bearing some relationship to proportionality while third strike
sentences may be inversely proportional to the underlying conduct.
In Lockyer v. Andrade, the defendant, who had a prior
conviction, was charged with two felony counts of petty theft for
stealing videotapes valued under $200. 116 The Supreme Court
upheld two consecutive twenty-five-year-to-life sentences, finding
that the sentence was not grossly disproportionate. 117
Faced with an offender like Andrade, the trial court could have
sentenced him to? (1) one count of petty theft, with a maximum term
of six months, 1 8 (2) two counts of petty theft, with a maximum term
of one year, 119 (3) one count of petty theft with a prior, with a
114. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 120.
115. Id. The lack of proportionality is even more evident if an offender's
third strike is possession of marijuana or petty theft with a prior. Nor are such
cases rare. 57% of all third strike felons have received their third strike
sentence for a non-violent offense. Cal. Dep't of Corrections, Second and
Third Strikers in the Institution Population, at tbl. 1: Second and Third Strikers
in the Institution Population by Offense Category, Offense Group and
Admission or Return Status (Mar. 31, 2004), available at
http://www.corr.ca.gov/OffenderInfoServices/Reports/Quarterly/Strikel/STRI
KEld0403.pdf. Other aspects of the law contribute to unfair and
disproportionate sentences under the third strike provisions: for example,
minimum sentences must be consecutive, not concurrent, CAL. PENAL CODE §§
667(a)(1), 1170.12(a)(8) (West 2004); the law provides for no washout period,
leaving an aging offender subject to an indeterminate life sentence for any
felony committed long past his earlier criminal career, see id. §§ 667, 1170.12;
and, as in Andrade, a prosecutor can choose to charge what would have been a
misdemeanor as a felony and then use that as the offender's third strike.
116. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 66.
117. Id. at 76-77.
118. CAL. PENAL CODE § 490 (West 2004).
119. Id. § 666.
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maximum term of three years, 120 (4) two counts of petty theft with a
prior, with a maximum of three years and eight months,' 2' (5) one
count of petty theft with a prior under Three Strikes, with a minimum
term of twenty-five years, 122 or (5) two counts of petty theft with a
prior under Three Strikes, with a minimum term of fifty years.
123
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's holding, the sentencing
options available to the trial court in Andrade still demonstrate the
previous point about disproportional punishment. Furthermore,
those options demonstrate the inconsistency between section 1170
and Three Strikes.
In the previous example, the offender's underlying conduct
remains the same, and yet the punishment options range from
maximum terms of six months to fifty years. That is inconsistent
with section 1170's command that the goal of punishment "is best
served by terms proportionate to the seriousness of the offense with
provision for uniformity in the sentences of offenders committing the
same offense under similar circumstances."
' 124
Apart from the lack of a coherent penal philosophy, the law's
application is problematic. The apparent intent of Three Strikes'
drafters was to make the law mandatory. 125  Despite the state
supreme court's holding to the contrary, the law did not allow judges
to dismiss prior strikes to avoid enhanced sentences without a motion
from prosecutors. 26  While the law appeared mandatory for
prosecutors as well, it contained no sanctions for the failure to charge
a Three Strikes case under the law. 127 As a result, even during the
first two years after its passage, only about 10 percent of those
eligible for penalties under the third strike provision were admitted to
120. Id.
121. Id. §§ 666, 1170.1.
122. Id. §§ 667(c)(6), 1170.12(a)(6).
123. Id. §§ 667(c)(6), 1170.12 (a)(6). Alternatively, the prosecutor may
choose how to file the charges.
124. Id. § 1170.
125. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 9.
126. Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes and the Romero Case: The Supreme
Court Restores Democracy, 30 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1601, 1643, 1648-49
(1997).
127. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 25-26.
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the Adult Authority. 128 That figure has declined to only 5 percent in
more recent years.' 29 By comparison, the two strikes provision has
been used more frequently (for about 60 percent of those eligible)
and remains a powerful plea bargaining tool. 1
30
The infrequent use of the third strike provisions may solve some
problems because its non-use may prevent further expansion of the
prison population. This relates to another problem, however:
whether the law as applied has the predictability of the lottery.
Within some jurisdictions, the district attorney may apply the law in
a consistent manner, for example, only to third strike felons whose
third felony is a violent one.1 31 Elsewhere, the law is applied far
more frequently.'
32
While some variation in punishment from county to county is
inevitable, the current scheme produces gross variations that raise
basic fairness concerns. One can see the dramatic inequities that
arise under the law by reference to the Andrade example above.'
33
Across the state, prosecutors are making the kinds of charging
decisions described there: in some counties, someone charged with
two petty thefts is charged with one or two counts of misdemeanor
theft, 134 while Andrade demonstrates, elsewhere a prosecutor is
willing to throw the book at the defendant. That kind of unbridled
discretion should not be tolerated in a system that values
proportionality, fairness and the rule of law.
128. Franklin E. Zimring, Presentation at Sentencing Practice and Policy:
Dollars and Sense, McGeorge School of Law (Apr. 16, 2004) (on file with
author).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. In Los Angeles County, for example, if none of the charged offenses are
serious or violent felonies, then the case is presumed to be a second strike case
rather than a third strike case. For the Three Strikes policy of the Los Angeles
District Attorney's Office, see L.A. County District Attorney's Office, Three
Strikes Policy: Special Directive (Dec. 19, 2000) [hereinafter LA Three Strikes
Policy], http://da.co.la.ca.us/3strikes.htm.
132. Males & Macallair, supra note 4, at 67-68 (finding that Sacramento and
Los Angeles counties applied the law approximately seven times more
frequently than did Alameda and San Francisco counties).
133. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 118-124.
134. See LA Three Strikes Policy, supra note 131, http://da.co.la.ca.us/
3strikes.htm; Males & Macallair, supra note 4, at 67-68.
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III. THREE STRIKES IN THE COURTS
Americans often look to the courts to protect individual rights,'
35
especially when the legislative process fails.136 California adopted
Three Strikes, "the toughest law in America," 137 when anti-crime
sentiment was inflamed by the kidnapping and murder of Polly
Klaas, 138 by the misperception that the crimes rate was on the rise,
and by a misleading campaign in support of the Three Strikes
initiative. 139 Three Strikes gained national attention for some of the
extreme applications of the law, involving trivial third strikes that led
to indeterminate life sentences. 140 Despite the public's ambivalence
about the law,14' the courts have not provided much relief from its
harshest effects.
Billing the law as one that would save lives and taxpayer dollars,
Three Strikes' backers promised it would keep "career criminals,
who rape women, molest innocent children and commit murder,
behind bars where they belong."'142 Given severe penalties already
135. Parties from across a broad political spectrum have advanced their
causes in the courts. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124
S. Ct. 2301 (2004) (father of elementary school student challenged the
constitutionality of a school district's policy requiring teacher-led recitation of
the Pledge of Allegiance); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992) (owner of beachfront property brought action alleging that application
of South Carolina Beachfront Management Act to his property constituted a
taking without just compensation); Wash. County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161
(1981) (female employee protesting employment and wage discrimination);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (State Farm
petitioning the Supreme Court for review of punitive and compensatory
damages awards in action brought against them by insureds).
136. As the Supreme Court has stated at times, the Court must intervene
when "isolated excessive penalties may occasionally be enacted, e.g., through
'honest zeal'.., generated in response to transitory public emotion." In re
Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 931-32 (Cal. 1972) (quoting Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S.
349 (1910)).
137. 60 Minutes, supra note 113.
138. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 5.
139. Vitiello, supra note 126, at 1637-43.
140. 60 Minutes, supra note 113.
141. See supra note 46.
142. Mike Reynolds et al., Arguments in Favor of Proposition 184, in CAL.
SEC'Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION, Nov.
8, 1994, at 36 (1994). The voter initiative, Proposition 184, was subsequently
codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West 2004).
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available for those crimes, Three Strikes does not add much in cases
involving such serious criminal conduct. 143  Even if it were to
succeed in protecting Californians from serious, violent offenders,
however, the law does much more. Among those serving
indeterminate life sentences under the law are 357 prisoners whose
third strike was theft of property valued at less than $400, and
another 678 prisoners whose third strike resulted from the possession
of a small quantity of drugs for personal use. 44 Overall, about one-
half of all Three Strikes sentences are imposed on felons whose third
strike was, within the meaning of Three Strikes, non-serious and
non-violent. 
14 5
The following examples are cases handled by one of the drafters
of this report and illustrate why many Californians are ambivalent
about the law. A homeless man, with no prior violent offenses,
received a twenty-five-years-to-life sentence for stealing an umbrella
and two bottles of liquor on a cold, rainy night from a
supermarket. 146 Another received a fifty-years-to-life sentence for
two episodes of shoplifting videotapes valued at $153.'47 He also
had no history of violence in his criminal past. 148 Yet another man
received a twenty-five-years-to-life sentence when he was convicted
143. CAL. PENAL CODE § 264 (West 2004) (upper term of eight years for
rape); id. § 667.5 (providing a three-year enhancement for every prior prison
term served for violation of section 264, for defendants with current section
264 convictions); id. § 288 (upper term of eight years for lewd acts on a child);
id. § 667.51 (providing a five-year enhancement for defendants convicted of
violating section 288, with the same as a prior conviction, and fifteen-years-to-
life for defendants with two prior convictions).
144. Cal. Dep't of Corrections, supra note 115, available at http://www.corr.
ca.gov/offenderInfoservices/Reports/Quarterly/Strikel/STRIKE 1 d0403.pdf;
see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 487 (West 2004) (defining grand theft as theft
over $400).
145. See Cal. Dep't of Corrections, supra note 115, available at
http://www.corr.ca.gov/offenderInfoservices/Reports/Quarterly/Strikel/STRIK
Eld0403.pdf (providing the breakdown of the triggering offenses for all 7372
third strikers: 3142 involving crimes against the person, and 3586 involving
crimes against property or drug offenses); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7
(West 2004) (providing the list of offenses that count as "serious" offenses for
the purposes of the three strikes law); id. § 667.5 (providing the list of offenses
that count as "violent" offenses for the purposes of the three strikes law).
146. Durden v. California, 531 U.S. 1184 (2001).
147. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
148. Id. at 78.
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of possession of an amount of cocaine so small that it would fit
underneath one's pinky nail.' 49  Yet another defendant with no
violent prior crimes received an indeterminate life sentence for
stealing a $128 TV. 1
50
Given extreme sentences like these one might have expected the
courts to give the law a begrudging reading. That has not been the
case. A few examples demonstrate the harshness of many of the
California courts' decisions.
Three Strikes proponents argued in favor of truth in
sentencing. 151 They were critical of a system that released prisoners
long before they served the announced term of imprisonment.
Instead of allowing release after as little as one-half of the sentence
imposed by the trial court, the law's drafters included a provision
that limited the amount of good time credit to 20% of a prisoner's
sentence. 152 Many believed that provision would allow a third strike
prisoner to secure release after serving twenty years if the mandatory
minimum was twenty-five years. 153 This was not true according to
the California Supreme Court, however.
In In re Cervera,154 the court gave a technical reading of the
Three Strikes law to limit the law's provision allowing good time
credits only to determinate sentences.' 55 As a result of Cervera,
149. Banyard v. Duncan, No. CV99-11018-JSL, 2004 WL 2338149, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2004).
150. Rico v. Terhune, 63 Fed. Appx. 394 (9th Cir. 2003).
151. See Pete Wilson, California Strikes Back, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Mar. 9, 1994, at B7 (praising the passage of Three Strikes as a step that will
"restore Truth in Sentencing"); Greg Lucas, Political Ad Watch, S.F. CHRON.,
Oct. 7, 1994, at A2 (discussing an advertisement featuring Pete Wilson with
the text "truth in sentencing" shown on the screen against a prison backdrop,
praising Wilson's role in passing the three strikes statute).
152. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(c)(5), 1170.12(a)(5) (West 2002).
153. See ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 135 (estimating the peak impact
based on twenty years of experience with Three Strikes).
154. 16 P.3d 176 (Cal. 2001).
155. Id. at 182. The court held that the three strikes law does not authorize
use of prison conduct credits, pursuant to California Penal Code art. 2.5, by a
third-striker against his mandatory indeterminate term of life imprisonment.
Id. at 178. In examining the language of the three strikes statute, the court
found that it does not expressly prohibit application of Article 2.5 prison
conduct credits against a defendant's mandatory indeterminate term of life
imprisonment. Id. at 179. However, the language does not expressly authorize
its application either. Id. The court determined that the reference in the three
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prisoners must serve at least the mandatory minimum sentence of
twenty-five years without any possibility of early release.' 
56
The court has shown a similar harsh application of the law in
other cases as well. For example, it has held that a person charged
with multiple counts must serve the minimum sentences
consecutively if the felony convictions do not arise from the same
facts and are committed at different times. 157 That explains why in a
case like Lockyer v. Andrade, the defendant, convicted of two counts
of petty theft, faces a minimum term of fifty years in prison.'
58
Similarly, the court has held that even when an offender is
charged with multiple counts arising out of separate transactions in a
single criminal proceeding, the law treats each count as a separate
strike.' 5 9 Hence, if the police arrest an offender for a string of
qualifying felonies and the state brings a single criminal proceeding,
the offender now qualifies for an indeterminate life sentence upon
the offender's release from prison. As with cases like Andrade, the
third strike may be a minor felony.'
60
strikes statute to Article 2.5 allows the application of prison conduct credits to
determinate terms only. Id. at 180. Because the statute did not authorize
unlimited application of prison conduct credits, they could not be applied
against the mandatory indeterminate life sentence. Id. at 179. The court
further noted that the purpose of the three strikes law, to impose longer terms
of imprisonment on defendants with two strikes and three strikes, also supports
prohibiting application of the prison conduct credits against the mandatory
indeterminate life sentence. Id. at 180.
156. Id. at 182.
157. People v. Hendrix, 941 P.2d 64, 67 (Cal. 1997).
158. See 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
159. People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1998).
160. Allowing multiple counts in the same proceeding to make a person
eligible for a third strike twenty-five-year-to-life sentence upon his next
conviction, perhaps for a minor felony like petty theft with a prior, seems
inconsistent with the purpose of the law. Its proponents argued that the law
was targeted at high-rate offenders; incarcerating them protected the public
because of the view that a small number of high-rate offenders commit a
disproportionate amount of crime. See Jones, supra note 6, at 24. A person
convicted of two crimes, occurring over a short period of time, may be deterred
from committing serious crimes in the future. Under the court's interpretation,
such a person remains a target of the law, no matter how minor his third
felony. See supra notes 151-159 and accompanying text.
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One notable exception to this trend of harsh enforcement
appeared in People v. Superior Court (Romero). 161 There, the court
held that a trial court had the discretion to strike a prior qualifying
felony on its own, without awaiting a motion by the prosecution.
6 2
While some of the law's supporters were initially critical of the
court's decision, 163 others contended that Romero saves the law from
charges of unconstitutionality. 164 For example, some Three Strikes
proponents argued that trial courts would use their discretion to strike
prior felonies in cases where an indeterminate life sentence otherwise
appeared to be excessive. 
165
Romero's theoretical advantages have not been fulfilled in
practice, 166 which is in part a result of the state supreme court's
decision in People v. Williams.
167
161. 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996).
162. The California Supreme Court held that a court has the discretion to
dismiss a prior charge that would operate as a strike to enhance sentencing
under the three strikes statute. Id. at 630. This discretion is derived from
California Penal Code Section 1385. Section 1385 allows a court to dismiss
charges, either in entirety or in part, "in furtherance of justice." In the case of
three strikes application, a court can dismiss a prior charge pursuant to section
1385 because there is nothing in the three strikes statute that limits section
1385 discretion. Id. The Court further determined that a court can dismiss a
prior charge on its own motion. Id. at 630, 647. The court found that to
require a prosecutor's approval to dismiss a charge would be a violation of the
separation of powers of doctrine. Id. at 634. The separation of powers issue
arises because the process which leads to either sentencing or acquittal after
the decision to prosecute has been made is only judicial in nature, and it is
therefore the province of the courts. Id. at 635.
163. See Stephanie Simon, Angry 'Three Strikes' Supporters Vow To Fight
Back, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1996, at A20. Almost immediately after the
Romero ruling, supporters of the three strikes law proposed pressuring the
legislature "to find a way to reinstate the original intent of 'three strikes,'
perhaps rewording it to eliminate judicial [discretion]." Id.
164. Janiskee & Erler, supra note 3, at 60-65.
165. Id.; see Rebecca Gross, Comment, The "Spirit" of the Three Strikes
Law: From the Romero Myth to the Hopeful Implications of Andrade, 32
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 169, 180-81 (2002).
166. Legislative Analyst's Office, The "Three Strikes and You're Out" Law:
An Update (Oct. 14, 1997) [hereinafter LAO, Update] (noting that "[tihe
number of second-strikers admitted to prison... has changed little since the
People v. Romero court decision"), available at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/handouts/pre_1999/ho101497_3_strikesupdate.html.
167. 948 P.2d429 (Cal. 1998).
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The state charged Williams with driving under the influence,
with three prior DUI offenses.' 68  Under California law, the
prosecutor may charge the offense as a misdemeanor or as a
felony. 169 In Williams' case, the prosecutor charged the DUI as a
felony that could have resulted in the imposition of an indeterminate
life sentence because of Williams' prior felony convictions. 170 The
trial court struck a prior felony conviction because the offender's
third strike was not violent and because he was going through drug
rehabilitation,' 7 1 but the appellate courts found that the trial court
abused its discretion in striking the prior felony. 1
72
Although it reviewed the trial court's order for an abuse of
discretion, the supreme court affirmed the appellate court's holding
that the trial court abused its discretion.' 73 According to Williams,
lower courts must balance the excessiveness of the sentence (in light
of mitigating factors) against society's legitimate interest in the fair
prosecution of properly charged crimes. 174  A lower court's
discretion must be guided by the spirit of the law and not by factors
extrinsic to the law, including concern about calendar congestion or
antipathy to the particular statute.' 
75
After Williams, courts of appeal have routinely reversed trial
courts when they have dismissed a prior strike to avoid imposition of
an indeterminate life sentence. 176 An empirical study of the case law
suggests that Romero, if intended to avoid extreme sentences under
'77Three Strikes, has had a negligible effect.
One exception to the general trend of strict enforcement of the
law was the decision of the district court of appeal in People v.
168. Id. at 431.
169. Id.; see also CAL. VEH. CODE § 23160 (West 2004).
170. Williams, 948 P.2d at 431.
171. Id. at 434.
172. Id. at 439-40.
173. Id. at 438.
174. Id. at 437.
175. Id.
176. People v. Wallace, 93 P.3d 1037 (Cal. 2004); People v. Gaston, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 829 (1999); People v. McGlothin, 79 Cal. Rptr 2d 83 (1998); People
v. Strong, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490 (2001).
177. LAO, Update, supra note 164, available at http://www/lao.ca.gov/
handouts/pre_1999/ho 1 014973 strikesupdate.html.
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Carmony.178 There, the defendant's third felony was his failure to
reregister as a sex offender. 179 Because he had recently reregistered,
the police knew where he was living.180 The record suggested that
he was not evading the law.' 8' Despite counsel's argument that his
current offense was among the most passive of crimes and was mala
prohibitum, the trial court refused to strike a prior felony and
imposed an indeterminate life sentence. 182 A divided panel of the
district court of appeal reversed and held that the trial court abused
its discretion in refusing to strike a prior felony.1
83
The state supreme court reversed.184  Before that court, the
Attorney General argued that appellate courts have the power to
review a trial court's decision to strike a prior felony, but unless the
sentence violates the state or federal constitution, an appellate court
lacks the authority to review a trial court's refusal to strike prior
felony convictions. 185 The court rejected that argument and held that
an appellate court has the power to review the trial court's decision
refusing to strike a prior felony, 186 but the appellate court may
reverse only if the trial court abused its discretion.' 87 The supreme
court disagreed with the court of appeal and held that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion.' 88 Thus, Carmony further limits any
curative effect that Romero was to have.
Probably the most obvious challenge to a life sentence for a
third felony of shopliffing or possession of traces of illegal drugs is
that the sentence violates the prohibition against excessive criminal
sentences. 89 The United States Supreme Court has held that the
178. No. C038802, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 1943 (Feb. 28, 2003), rev'd, 92
P.3d 369 (Cal. 2004).
179. Id. at*1.
180. Id. at *5-*6.
181. Id. (noting that Carmony reported to the parole office as instructed once
his parole officer discovered that Carmony had failed to re-register).
182. Id. at* 1, *6-*7.
183. Id. at *1-*2.
184. People v. Carmony, 92 P.3d 369 (Cal. 2004).
185. Reply Brief for Respondent at 2-3, People v. Carmony, 92 P.3d 369
(Cal. 2004) (No. S115090).
186. Carmony, 92 P.3d at 374.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 375.
189. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
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Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual sentences
does apply to grossly disproportionate sentences.190 Even before the
Supreme Court so held, the California Supreme Court found a
similar protection in the state's constitutional provision against cruel
or unusual punishment.191
Some state trial courts refused to impose life sentences under
Three Strikes because they found the sentences to be excessive.
1 92
State appellate courts have uniformly found that Three Strikes
sentences were constitutional. 193 The state supreme court has yet to
address that question. 1
94
190. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983).
191. In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 922-23 (Cal. 1972).
192. E.g., People v. Smith, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 9 (Ct. App. 1996) (reversing trial
court's decision to strike prior serious felony convictions); People v. Drew, 47
Cal. Rptr. 2d 319 (Ct. App. 1995) (reversing trial court's decision to strike
prior serious felonies to avoid Three Strikes sentence of twenty-five-years-to-
life for possession of codeine); People v. Patton, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 702 (Ct. App.
1995) (modifying lenient sentence to twenty-five-years-to-life for possession
of cocaine base in order to reflect correct Three Strikes sentence); People v.
Superior Court (Missamore), 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392 (Ct. App. 1995) (reversing
sentence of probation for possession of marijuana when it was defendant's
fourth felony); People v. Gore, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (Ct. App. 1995) (reversing
order to dismiss prior felony); People v. Bailey, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205 (Ct. App.
1995) (reversing trial court's decision to strike prior offenses to avoid Three
Strikes sentence of twenty-five-years-to-life for shoplifting items valued at
$250).
193. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (upholding two consecutive
twenty-five-year-to-life sentences for stealing videotapes valued under $200);
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding twenty-five-year-to-life
sentence for stealing nearly $1200 worth of golf clubs); People v. Barrera, 82
Cal. Rptr. 2d 755 (Ct. App. 1999) (upholding twenty-five-year-to-life sentence
for forging $400 check); People v. Cooper, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106 (Ct. App.
1996) (upholding twenty-five-year-to-life sentence for being ex-felon in
possession of handgun); People v. Kinsey, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 769 (Ct. App.
1995) (upholding twenty-nine-year-to-life sentence for attempted injury on
cohabitant, assault and battery); People v. Cartwright, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351 (Ct.
App. 1995) (upholding sentence of 428 years to life for rape); People v.
Superior Court (Romero), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (Ct. App. 1995) (vacating
lower court's order striking prior serious offenses allowing for Three Strikes
life sentence for possession of controlled substance). Finally, in 2005, a
divided panel of the Third District Court of Appeal held that a Three Strikes
life sentence violated the Eighth Amendment and California's prohibition
against cruel or unusual punishment. People v. Carmony, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365
(2005).
194. People v. Carmony, 92 P.3d 369, 377 n.6. (Cal. 2004).
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Finally, first in 1999 and then in 2001, four members of the
United States Supreme Court questioned whether specific Three
Strikes sentences violated the Eighth Amendment.' 95 While the four
Members of the Court disagreed whether to grant certiorari in the
specific cases before the Court, their opinions issued along with the
denial of certiorari left little doubt that four Members of the Court
would strike down a Three Strikes sentence in the appropriate
case. 196
Influenced by the views of the four Justices, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a specific Three
Strikes sentence did violate the Eighth Amendment. 197 According to
the Ninth Circuit, the fifty-years-to-life sentence imposed on
Leonardo Andrade was excessive and the state appellate court was
unreasonable in its application of existing settled Supreme Court
precedent. 198  A different panel of the Ninth Circuit extended
Andrade in two cases in which the defendants received twenty-five-
year-to-life sentences and in which, unlike Andrade, both defendants
had at least one prior violent felony conviction.
199
Any thought that the Ninth Circuit might provide relief for those
suffering from some of the more extreme Three Strikes sentences
was short-lived. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Andrade based on federal law limiting the ability of state
prisoners to challenge their criminal sentences in federal court,200 but
195. Riggs v. California, 525 U.S. 1114 (1999); Durden v. California, 531
U.S. 1184 (2001).
196. Riggs, 525 U.S. 1114; Durden, 531 U.S. 1184; see also Vitiello, supra
note 4, at 1052.
197. Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 767 (9th Cir. 2001)
(reversing defendant's sentence of fifty-years-to-life for stealing several
videotapes from a K-Mart store on two separate occasions); see also Brown v.
Mayle, 283 F.3d 1019, 1040 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing sentences of twenty-
five-years-to-life for two defendants, one for attempting to steal three
videotapes and the other for attempting to steal a steering wheel alarm).
198. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 747.
199. Brown, 283 F.3d at 1034.
200. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). In the majority
opinion, Justice O'Connor focused on whether relief was appropriate under the
writ of habeas corpus. According to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000), a federal
court can grant habeas corpus to a state prisoner only if the state court
proceedings "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by
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held in a companion case that the offender's Three Strikes sentence
did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
20 1
Ewing v. California produced no majority opinion. Two justices
would have held that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to terms
of imprisonment. 202  Writing for a three justice plurality, Justice
O'Connor agreed with the four dissenters that under some
circumstances, a term of years may violate the Eighth
Amendment.20 3  While Justice O'Connor's opinion left open the
possibility that some Three Strikes sentences may violate the Eighth
Amendment, she did not leave much room for successful
challenges. 20 4 For example, she rejected the argument that a court
should look solely at the offender's current felony, but instead,
consistent with the philosophy of Three Strikes, may look to the
offender's entire criminal record.20 5 Alternatively, she observed that
the state had the latitude to sentence Ewing to a minimum term of
twenty-five years for the crime of grand theft.20 6 While the Ninth
Circuit has found one case that may be the truly rare case to which
Justice O'Connor alluded,20 7 California cannot expect much help
from the federal courts in curtailing Three Strikes' excesses, despite
what appear to be gross inequities in the ways in which prosecutors
the Supreme Court of the United States." O'Connor wrote that there was no
clearly established federal law, distinguishing the facts of Andrade from the
facts of Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), by noting that Helm had been
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, whereas Andrade would be
eligible for parole, albeit after fifty years in prison at the age of eighty seven-
years old. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72-74. O'Connor wrote that the Eighth
Amendment argument that the sentence was grossly disproportionate to the
offense was only a general principle, not clearly established federal law. Id. at
73. O'Connor did not explain why the three-part test developed by the
majority opinion in Solem was not clearly established federal law. She found
error with the Ninth Circuit decision because it used the "clear error" test for
determining if a court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law,
when the appropriate test is whether the decision was "objectively
unreasonable." Id. at 75.
201. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003).
202. Id. at 31-33 (Scalia, J. & Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
203. Id. at 21.
204. Vitiello, Judicial Activism, supra note 4, at 1058-59.
205. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29.
206. See id. at 28-29.
207. Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2004).
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use their discretion around the state.20 8  For example, data
demonstrate wide variations in the law's application from county to
county.1°9 More importantly, the law has been led to significantly
different application based on the race of the defendant; African-
American and Latino defendants are more likely than white
defendants to receive third strike sentences.
210
One other judicial route may still be open. As mentioned above,
shortly after the law's adoption, some state trial courts found specific
life sentences excessive in violation of California's constitutional
prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment.211  With the
exception of dictum from one case, the state appellate courts have
been hostile to that argument. 212  Until 2005, the state appellate
courts universally upheld the constitutionality of Three Strikes
208. However, several possible arguments still remain to be made. One
argument is based on the inequitable geographical variation resulting from the
inconsistent application of Three Strikes throughout the state. However, there
is no case law precedent for invalidating a sentence based on geographical
variation. One case, now pending before the Ninth Circuit, involves a 225-
years-to-life sentence for nine counts of burglary, leaving no chance for parole
in defendant James Skinner's lifetime. A successful argument may exist
because of the way the Supreme Court distinguished Andrade, 538 U.S. 63
(2003), from Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983), which found that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual sentences does apply to
grossly disproportionate sentences). In Andrade, the Court distinguished the
facts from Helm because Andrade had a chance for parole after fifty years
(even though Andrade would be eighty-seven years old when eligible),
whereas a defendant sentenced to 225-years to life would never have a chance
for parole in his lifetime. Additionally, a possible equal protection argument
exists, based on the fact that African-Americans and Latinos are shown to be
much more likely to be sentenced under the California Three Strikes law than a
non-minority. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, Release 1: MEASURING
RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 12, 28 (2004), http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/
Recidivism General.pdf. However, in order to make a successful equal
protection argument, discriminatory intent or purpose behind the law must be
proven, and that is not evident in this situation; disparate impact is not enough.
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
209. Males & Macallair, supra note 4, at 67-68.
210. Id. at 67, 70 tbl.4.
211. Supra note 192.
212. People v. Cluff, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 80 (Ct. App. 2001).
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213sentences no matter how extreme the facts of the case. They have
done so, arguably, in disregard of settled state supreme court
precedent giving a more expansive interpretation to California's
prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment than the United
States Supreme Court has given to the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
2 14
The state supreme court recently avoided reaching the state
constitutional issue in People v. Carmony."1 It held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike a prior
felony.216  It did not reach the state constitutional issue, but
remanded that question to the court of appeal.217 On remand, a
divided panel of the Third District Court of Appeal did find that a 26
year-to-life sentence violated both the Eighth Amendment and
California's prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment. 218
Even if the state supreme court lets stand a finding that
Carmony's sentence is excessive under the state constitution it is not
likely to affect a broad reform of Three Strikes' excesses.
Carmony's third strike, failure to register as a sex offender, is a
passive offense, causing no direct harm to others. 219  Further,
Carmony had recently reregistered, had not moved in the interim,
and had no intent to evade the police.220 Hence, his failure to register
did not pose a risk of harm to the police or to others. As a result,
even the ruling in Carmony's favor may be limited to its facts, not
addressing the broader questions posed in cases like Andrade and
other petty theft cases or cases involving felony possession of small
quantities of drugs as the offenders' final strike. Hence, Californians
cannot look to the courts for help in reforming Three Strikes'
excesses.
213. Supra note 194.
214. Vitiello, JudicialActivism, supra note 4, at 1028-29.
215. 92 P.3d 369, 377 n.6 (Cal. 2004).
216. Id. at 371.
217. Id. at 377 n.6.
218. 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365 (2005).
219. People v. Carmony, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 1943, at *14, rev'd, 92 P.3d
369 (Cal. 2004).
220. Id. at *14-*15.
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IV. THE OLDER PRISONS POPULATION: SPECIAL PROBLEMS
AND A PARTIAL SOLUTION
Section II reviewed the lack of a coherent penal philosophy in
California's sentencing scheme. One consequence of the haphazard
way in which the legislature has created sentencing enhancement
provisions is that many offenders receive sentences that are far
longer than necessary for social protection and are often
disproportionate to the severity of the offender's criminal conduct.
Those sentences are too long when compared to the underlying
conduct and when compared to sentences imposed on other felons in
California.
22 1
In addition to long prison sentences, California's parole system
has not performed as well as it could. As identified by the Little
Hoover Commission, California's parole policies have led to high
recidivism rates.222 The failure to do more than punish in our prisons
returns parolees to the streets with little chance of successful
integration back into society. 223 States with more successful parole
systems reduce their prison populations more than does California,
even if they impose similar, long criminal sentences, because fewer
parolees return to prison.224 California's high rate of parole failure
means that prisoners will serve extremely long prison sentences,
often unnecessarily.
Long prison sentences and parole failure create special problems
for aging felons and cost California dearly, yet offer little, if any,
additional protection to the public. One of the signers of this report
has written and testified extensively on the special problems of aging
prisoners. 225 The following are highlights of those special problems;
221. See Franklin E. Zimring, Populism, Democratic Government, and the
Decline of Expert Authority: Some Reflections on "Three Strikes" in
California, 28 PAC. L.J. 243, 248-51 (1996) (providing an example under
Three Strikes: a felon who commits a burglary, a theft, and a burglary does not
qualify for a Three Strikes sentence. In contrast, an offender who is convicted
of the same crimes, but is convicted of the two burglaries and then the theft,
may be sentenced to 25-years-to life under Three Strikes).
222. Little Hoover Commission, supra note 24, at i, available at
http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/l72/reportl72.pdf.
223. Id. at 55.
224. Id. at iv-v.
225. See Turley Hearing, supra note 56; Professor Jonathan Turley,
Presentation at Sentencing Practices and Policies: Dollars & Sense (Apr. 16,
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this report suggests some relatively cost free solutions to those
problems.
Dramatic increases in the prison population are the result of a
combination of the increased use of incapacitation rather than
probation, longer sentences, reduced parole opportunities, and high
recidivism rates.2 26  Within that expanding population, the
percentage of older prisoners is growing faster than the overall prison
population. For example, in 1986, only 11.3 percent of all federal
prisoners were fifty years or older.2 27 That number rose to over 25
percent of the total population by 1989 and is projected to reach one
third by 2010.228 The number of California prisoners older than fifty-
five is expected to increase from about 6,000 to over 30,000 in 2022,
increasing more rapidly than the general prison population.
229
Three Strikes is not the only law that has added significantly to
the aging of the prison population, but it does its share. The authors
of Punishment and Democracy identified some of the reasons why
third strike felons are often aging felons. Among them, it takes time
for a felon to build up the first two qualifying felonies. 23 Apart from
the timing of the first and second arrests and successful prosecutions,
the felon will have served some time in prison. As a result, many
third strike felons are entering the prison system in their mid-thirties
and will not be released until they are sixty years old or older.
231
Prisons are expensive to maintain. Apart from construction
costs, the cost of warehousing prisoners is rising rapidly.232 That is
2004) (on file with author); Jonathan Turley et al., Project for Older Prisoners:
Report to the State of New York, 1994 (on file with author); Jonathan Turley,
A Solution to Prison Overcrowding, USA TODAY MAG., Nov. 1992, at 80;
Jonathan Turley, Why Prison Health Care is a Crime, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 19,
1991, at A19.
226. Turley Hearing, supra note 56.
227. Connie L. Neeley et al., Addressing the Needs of Elderly Offenders,
CORRECTIONs TODAY, Aug. 1997, at 120.
228. Id.
229. California Legislative Analyst's Office, Analysis of the 2003-2004
Budget Bill (Feb. 19, 2003) [hereinafter LAO, Analysis], available at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2003/crimjustice/cj_04_5240_anIO3.htm#__
Toc32742721.
230. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 146.
231. See id. at 58.
232. Turley Hearing, supra note 56, at 2-3; see also Deukmejian Report,
supra note 16, sec. 7, Inmate and Parolee Population Management (identifying
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especially true in California because wage concessions to the
powerful California Corrections and Peace Officers Association
make California prison guards the best paid in the nation.233 Their
pay raises have outstripped inflation and other measures of cost of
living.
2 34
Increased medical costs also add to the cost of maintaining a
prison system. Subgroups of prisoners pose special problems. For
example, warehousing HIV-positive prisoners present special
challenges and entails added cost.2 35 The largest and fastest growing
segment of special needs prisoners, however, are geriatric prisoners.
On average, the cost of warehousing an older prisoner is two to three
times that of a younger prisoner. That cost approaches $70,000 a
year.
236
Not only are older prisoners expensive to maintain, but their
release into the general population-especially if done with
meaningful parole supervision and opportunities-represents a
the "growing cost of managing [California's] adult prison population"),
available at http://www.cpr.ca.gov/reports/indrpt/corr/index.htm.
233. Mark Gladstone, Guard Union in Showdown, MERCURY NEWS, June
22, 2004, at 1A ("Hefty salary increases that outpaced most state workers have
made them among the highest-paid prison guards in the country.").
234. See id.
235. Turley Hearing, supra note 56, at 17-18.
236. LAO, Analysis, supra note 229, available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/
analysis 2003/crimjustice/cj_04_5240_an103.htm#_Toc32742721. The high-
est costs result from medical care and maintenance, typical of any aging
population. But costs rise in prisons that fail to segregate older prisoners into
geriatric units where delivery of health care is more efficient than when older
prisoners are scattered in the general prison population. Segregating older
prisoners can reduce costs in a number of ways; one example is that earlier
identification of medical problems, before they become chronic, may result in
a geriatric unit. Id. See also Turley Hearing, supra note 56, at 24 (discussing
the non-fiscal problems for maintenance and security associated with the
increasing population of older prisoners)
Since roughly 50% of a prison's operating costs are dedicated to
officer salaries and benefits, efforts to extend prison resources and
control costs have centered on the officer to inmate ratio. Older
prisoners often frustrate such efforts by requiring special care and
attention within the system. In addition to difficulties in mobility and
interaction, older prisoners can be targets of abuse by younger
prisoners. Older prisoners make ideal targets for theft, extortion, and
even sexual assault ....
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:903
limited social risk of harm.23 7 That is especially true when one
compares the choices that their continued imprisonment force a state
to make. One choice is to continue to build prisons and to overcrowd
those already in existence. Both are costly and California has
"maxed out" on its ability to increase prison budgets.238 A second
choice that California makes as a result of its decision to warehouse
increasing numbers of older prisoners is to release or to impose
shorter sentences on younger, more violent offenders.
239
Any wholesale reform of California's prison and sentencing
systems must consider reforming its treatment of older prisoners.24 °
Their proper management in prison and supervised early release into
the general population can dramatically slash costs. Because the
average cost of warehousing older prisoners is two to three times that
of maintaining younger prisoners, the release of 500 older prisoners
is equivalent to a reduction of 1,000 to 1,500 younger prisoners,
about the number of prisoners in two mid-sized prisons.
24 1
237. See, e.g., LAO, Analysis, supra note 229, available at http://
www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2003/crimjustice/cj 04_5240_an03.htm# Toc327
42721; Deukmejian Report, supra note 16, sec. 7, Inmate and Parolee
Population Management, available at http://www.cpr.ca.gov/reports/indrpt/
corr/index.htm.
238. See William Booth, Calif Budget Fix Is Easier Said than Done, WASH.
POST, Sept. 8, 2003, at AO1.
239. Turley Hearing, supra note 56, at 20.
240. In addition to early release or release to a community based facility,
California should also consider segregating older prisoners into geriatric units.
LAO, Analysis, supra note 229, available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_
2003/crimjustice/cj.04_5240_an 103.htm#Toc32742721; Deukmejian Report,
supra note 16, sec. 7 Inmate and Parolee Population Management, available at
http://www.cpr.ca.gov/reports/indrpt/corr/index.htm; see CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 6267 (Deering 2004); 2003 Cal. Stat. 708 (providing in part, it "is in the best
interest of the state to contract for skilled nursing facilities for the care of
inmates with long-term care needs, thereby lessening the burden on the prison
medical care system").
241. Turley Hearing, supra note 56, at 21-22 (stating that in California,
"[t]he cost of an older or geriatric inmate is likely between $40,000 to $70,000
per year.... [and] it is not uncommon to find geriatric inmates who cost the
system in excess of $100,000 per year"). Turley also notes that California
faces "a major demographic shift in its correctional system that will sharply
change the operational demands of its facilities and staff as well as contribute
to a sharp increase in per capita prisoner costs. This shift is due to the large
body of prisoners currently in or entering middle age." Id. at 3-4.
946
Winter 2004] A PROPOSAL FOR WHOLESALE REFORM 947
Another way to understand the looming budgetary crisis posed
by long term care of geriatric patients is to make some rough
calculations of what California will spend to maintain its graying
prison population in roughly twenty years. If the cost of maintaining
an older prisoner rises modestly to only $87,500 per year and that
figure is multiplied by the number of prisoners over sixty years old,
as projected by the Legislative Analyst's Office, the cost of
maintaining those prisoners will exceed $4 billion by 2025.242 That is
about the amount that California spent in 2002 to maintain its entire
prison system. 24 3 gray
Faced with that kind of budgetary crisis, California is likely to
face hard choices. The state must find a place to imprison younger,
violent felons. Simply adding prison beds is limited by fiscal
constraints.2 44 Overcrowding may lead to judicial intervention and
court ordered release, the least orderly form of prison reform.
24 5
Court ordered release is not likely to allow attention to the individual
risk posed by the offender.246 Emptying prisons willy-nilly increases
the cost to the public and renews the hue and cry for punitive
sanctions, but courts will do so if resources become scarce enough.
California can look to states that have a better track record in
dealing with prison reform. 247 The focus in this section is on those
reforms relating specifically to older prisoners. Above, this report
discussed why older prisoners are expensive to maintain and made
passing reference to the fact that their release represents a low risk to
public safety. Here, we need to explain the latter proposition, that
older prisoners represent a low risk to public safety.
As a general matter, older prisoners do not need to be
incarcerated in conventional prisons. Numerous studies show that
age is one of the most reliable predictors of recidivism.21 The data
show that recidivism rates drop significantly by the time an offender
242. Id. at 22-23.
243. Id. at 23.
244. See Martin, supra note 14.
245. Turley Hearing, supra note 56, at 25.
246. Id.
247. See infra notes 311-345 and accompanying text.
248. Turley Hearing, supra note 56, at 27; Deukmejian Report, supra note
16, sec. 7, Inmate and Parolee Population Management, available at
http://www.report.cpr.ca.gov/indrpt/corr/.
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reaches thirty years old.249 Likewise, the rate of recidivism among
federal prisoners over the age of forty is approximately a third of that
for prisoners under forty.2 50 A couple of examples suggest the
correlation between recidivism and age: some younger inmate
populations have a 90 percent likelihood of committing a new
offense upon their release from prison.251 New York has an overall
recidivism rate of 48 percent for all inmates, but only a 22.1 percent
rate for inmates between fifty and sixty-five years old, and a 7.4
percent rate among those over sixty-five.252 We underscore that not
every older prisoner is low-risk. Yet, the application of appropriate
selection criteria for release have proven that older prisoners can be
released with virtually no risk of recidivism.
Created in 1989,253 the Project for Older Prisoners (POPS) has
received national recognition for the work that it has done in
249. Turley Hearing, supra note 56, at 28 ("While academics often disagree
on the specific cause, ... [the decline in recidivism rates] is most likely due to
a mix of physiological and cultural influences."); see also id. at 29 ("Federal
statistics reflect the difference of age in recidivism that POPS has found on the
state level. Older federal prisoners are half as likely to commit new offenses as
younger prisoners and the difference is even greater with younger prisoners in
their late teens and early twenties.").
250. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, at tbl. 6.67. (2000) [hereinafter
SOURCEBOOK] Most of the prisoners in this forty-plus category are ineligible
for POPS, which uses fifty-five years as the threshold qualification. The rate
of recidivism for those prisoners fifty-five years or older is even lower.
Nationally, inmates between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine experienced
a recidivism rate of over fifty percent, while those fifty-five or older
experienced a rate of only two percent. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE BUREAU
OF. JUSTICE STATISTICS, TRENDS IN STATE PAROLE, 1990-2000,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/tspoo.pdf Illinois provides another
example, where older prisoners were over twice as likely to succeed on parole
than younger prisoners. Turley Hearing, supra note 56, at 31.
251. See sources cited supra note 250.
252. Id.
253. Jonathan Turley created Project for Older Prisoners (POPS) while a
professor of constitutional criminal law at Tulane University in Louisiana.
After Turley briefed and argued a case for a sixty-six-year-old man before the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, he discovered there were
scores of older prisoners among Louisiana's chronically overcrowded prison
system. It surprised Turley to find so many statistically low-risk prisoners in a
system releasing extremely high-risk prisoners in response to overcrowding
and court orders. Turley solicited the aid of volunteer law students to address
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developing criteria for evaluating older prisoners, isolating low-risk
prisoners, and recommending policies to reduce the cost of caring for
the members of this population while improving their care.
254
With the cooperation of the state, POPS researchers interview
prisoners over the age of fifty-five. The researcher evaluates the
prisoner based on a comprehensive questionnaire that explores the
prisoner's history.255  The evaluation is based on additional
information, including the person's prison file, interviews with
correctional personnel and the court, and news files available
online.
256
POPS determines whether the prisoner represents a low risk
based on two tests. If the organization decides to move forward it
contacts any living victims as part of a victim consultation.257 If the
the issue. Two-hundred students signed up, and POPS began. This initial
group discovered that older prisoner populations were increasing across the
nation. They began developing approaches to identify low-risk prisoners,
reduce the costs of care, and improve the level of care for this prison
population segment. POPS now has offices in Louisiana, North Carolina,
Michigan, and Washington, D.C., and seeks to educate the public as well as
political leaders about the older prison population. POPS operates on a
volunteer basis; there is no charge for its individual case services. POPS also
consults with states, at their request, on issues related to the older prisoner
population, as well as helping to draft legislation.
254. Jens Soering, The Perils of Freedom, AMERICA, July 512, 2004, at 20
(discussing how while few programs are available to former inmates as they
transition back into society, POPS is one of a small number of programs easing
the transition); Don Thompson, Associated Press, Elderly Inmate Population
and Costs Expected to Soar, Experts Say, (Feb. 25, 2003), available at
http://www.cdaa.org/3StrikesCCNews0203.htm; Tammerlin Drummond,
Cellblock Seniors, TIME MAG., June 21, 1999, at 60 (calling POPS an
"innovative program"), available at http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v99/
n653/a12.html; Jennifer Warren, The Graying of the Prisons, L.A. TIMES, June
9, 2002, at Al.
255. See Turley Hearing, supra note 56, at 36. The questionnaire explores
the prisoner's criminal history, chemical dependence history, health,
employment background, and family background.
256. POPS uses the court and news files available on the online resources of
Westlaw (www.westlaw.com), and LexisNexis (www.lexis.com). Recidivism
studies demonstrate that the data from these combined sources provide an
indicator "of whether a prisoner can safely be released into the general
population or placed in a program of supervised release." Id. at 36.
257. The victim/family member consultation has the potential to reveal
inconsistencies in information obtained from the prisoner, as well as any
violence or aggression not evident from the written record. POPS has
949
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:903
consultation does not derail the prisoner's release, the organization
develops a plan for the prisoner's release, including a determination
of available social benefits for which the person may qualify. After
POPS members have collected the data and prepared a report, which
includes a recommendation, the organization presents the report to
the appropriate agency or board.258 POPS has had a proven track
record with virtually no instances of additional criminal conduct
among those released pursuant to a POPS recommendation. 259
Without adopting any other recommendation in this report,
California could save significant amounts of money by adopting a
POPS. For example, the Legislative Analyst's Office predicted that
a POPS plan would remove between 200 to 300 inmates a year, for
an annual savings of between $9 and $14 million. 26 It estimates that
over a twenty-year period, the annual net savings to the CDC should
be about $530 million.
26'
To date, POPS has been conservative in its recommendations. 262
At a minimum, its continued effectiveness would be undercut if a
prisoner released upon its recommendation committed a serious
crime. For other older prisoners who represent a middle range risk,
California should consider a wide array of alternatives to
imprisonment in state prison. Intense parole supervision, the use of
disqualified otherwise eligible candidates based on victim consultations.
POPS was one of the first organizations to require victim consultations. Id. at
36-37.
258. Id. at 37-38.
259. Deukmejian Report, supra note 16, sec. 7, Inmate and Parolee
Population Management (citing Jonathan Turley, Presentation at Sentencing
Practice and Policy: Dollars and Sense, McGeorge School of Law (Apr. 16,
2004)), available at http://www.cpr.ca.gov/reports/indrpt/corr/index.htm;
Soering, supra note 254.
260. Turley Hearing, supra note 56, at 40.
261. Id. But see Deukmejian Report, supra note 16, sec. 7, Inmate and
Parolee Population Management (stating that implementation of POPS will
likely result in fewer early releases than the Legislative Analyst's Office
estimated, "because of its careful risk analysis and assessment of each
inmate"), available at http://www.report.cpr.ca.gov/indrpt/corr/. The true
savings, however, depend on the actual number of qualifying older felons.
262. Turley Hearing, supra note 56, at 42.
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electronic bracelets, and home detention are all cost effective means
of protecting the public.
263
Finally, release is inappropriate for high-risk offenders. A
number of states have created geriatric units.264  Older prisoners
prefer segregation from the general prison population for reasons of
safety and improved care.26 At a minimum, those prisoners will
suffer fewer stress related illnesses. 266  Other savings result from
consolidation of older prisoners. For example, prisons may be able
to save by purchasing and dispensing special services in bulk, rather
than dispensing them to small numbers of high-need prisoners in the
general prison population. 267  Transferring older prisoners to a
properly designed facility increases savings as well. A simple
example is illustrative: older prisoners, especially those using
walkers or wheelchairs, face difficulties in negotiating the typical
multi-tiered cellblock and create additional problems for correctional
officers. Additional savings may result from the creation of a
specially trained staff. Correctional doctors and nurses are not well
268trained in the special problems of older prisoners. Moving
prisoners into geriatric units and training a small staff of health care
providers allow early treatment that may prevent minor illness from
becoming chronic and expensive disorders.
269
263. Id.; Deukmejian Report, supra note 16, sec. 7, Inmate and Parolee
Population Management (endorsing similar recommendations), available at
http://www.cpr.ca.gov/reports/indrpt/corr/index.htm.
264. For older prisoners, such units are in great demand. Facilities like
Virginia's Staunton prison and North Carolina's McCain facility have long
waiting lists of requested transfers. Turley Hearing, supra note 56, at 43.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 44.
268. Id. at 45.
269. Id. at 45-46. Turley states,
[t]he aging process creates a problem called 'masking' in which
classic aging characteristics like sullen features and ashen color can
mask illnesses with similar characteristics. For example, the
symptoms of subclinical hypothyroidism include dry skin, cold
intolerance, poor memory, weight gain, slow thinking, weak muscles,
muscle cramps, puffy eyes, constipation, fatigue, apathy, and
cognitive impairment. These are the same physical characteristics of
aging and can be easily missed in a physical examination. By
developing special programs and facilities for geriatric inmates,
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The recommendations in this section should not be
controversial. POPS has proven its effectiveness elsewhere, in some
instances in states far more conservative than California. Some
savings are immediate, but importantly, as its aging prison
population swells, the failure to act now leaves California with a
balloon payment that will come due in the future.
V. SOLUTIONS
The system is broken. For much of the past decade, a strong
economy allowed California to spend money in prison construction
and prison system maintenance without making hard choices.
270
Those days are over.
Recent developments suggest that now is the time to address
wholesale reform of the system. Californians seem to have tired of
the excesses of Three Strikes2 7 1 and draconian sentencing
generally.27 2  A detailed report by the non-partisan Little Hoover
Commission has demonstrated the failure of California's parole
system and offers a game plan for reform.27 3
properly trained staff can develop greater expertise and dispense care
in a more cost-efficient manner.
Id.
270. Michael Vitiello, Reforming Three Strikes' Excesses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q.
1,4(2004).
271. See CAVC, Voter Survey, supra note 45 http://
www.amend3strikes.org/voters.htm. Even though the voters rejected
Proposition 66 during the 2004 election, the initiative had strong support until
right before the election when opposition materialized. See Furillo, supra note
47. That strong showing has gotten the attention of the state's district
attorneys and the Governor, who have now indicated that they support modest
reforms of Three Strikes. Mark Martin, Efforts to Reform 'Three Strikes Law
Likely to Be on Ballot Again, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 4, 2004, at B5.
272. The public seemed to tire of criminal sentences, at least for drug
offenders, when a significant majority voted for Proposition 36. See CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 1210, 1210.1 & 3063.1 (West Supp. 2004); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 11999.4-11999.13 (West Supp. 2004). Proposition 36
mandates probation and treatment for certain nonviolent drug offenders. See
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1210, 1210.1 & 3063.1; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 11999.4-11999.13.
273. Little Hoover Commission, supra note 24, available at http://www.
lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/172/report 172.pdf.
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On March 5, 2004, the Governor appointed a commission to
study the prison system.274  Published in late June 2004, the
Commission's report makes many of the same recommendations
stated in this report.275 While reforming Three Strikes was beyond
its mandate, the Commission's report recommends reconsideration of
how California treats non-violent prisoners, with an eye towards
using longer prison sentences primarily for violent offenders.276 It
expressly endorses the adoption of Turley's POPS for California.277
It urges adoption of a variety of alternatives to imprisonment,
including a wholesale reexamination of California's parole system.
278
It underscores the state's need for to reexamine its abandonment of
rehabilitative measures, not because of a change in penal philosophy,
but because many of those measures will reduce recidivism and the
cost of maintaining its prison system.279  These are welcome
recommendations because they reflect informed thinking about the
prison system, and if the Governor endorses them, his action will tell
us a great deal about his willingness to take on the prison system, an
entrenched, but troubled institution that has cost the state dearly.
280
Nationally, Justice Kennedy has said, "Enough." While he
voted to uphold indeterminate life terms in two cases before the
Court last term,28 1 his speech to the ABA does not mince words.282
He does not mention Three Strikes by name, but he must have had in
mind its draconian minimum sentences in his sweeping critique of
the criminal justice system.283 That the ABA was quick to appoint
274. Press Release, supra note 37, www.schwarzenegger.com/en/news/
uptotheminute/newsupto en duke-reform.asp?sec=news&subsec=uptothemi
nute.
275. Deukmejian Report, supra note 16, available at http://
www.cpr.ca.gov/reports/indrpt/corr/index.htm.
276. Id. § 7, Inmate and Parolee Population Management.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See id. (detailing the soaring costs of the corrections system, which
approaches $6 billion).
281. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S.
11(2003).
282. See Kennedy Speech, supra note 17, available at http://
www.abanet.org/media/kencomm/amkspeech03.html.
283. Id.
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the Kennedy Commission to study and make recommendations for
reform demonstrates that the time for prison and sentencing reform is
now.
Reform may take many different shapes. In his remarks at the
McGeorge conference, Frank Zimring identified numerous ways in
284which the legislature or voters might reform Three Strikes. One of
the drafters of this report has written elsewhere about other possible
reform measures.
285
Early support for Proposition 66 suggests that the public wants
reform to curb the excesses of the Three Strikes law. 286 Confusion
284. One option identified by Zimring is to require that the offender's
current offense, the final one which invokes three strikes eligibility, be a
serious or violent offense. He suggests this option for both the second and
third strikes provisions of the statute. Another option Zimring offers for both
the second and third strike provisions is to systematically exclude certain
enumerated felonies, minor felonies such as drug possession and theft, from
qualifying an offender for three strikes eligibility. Zimring also offers the
option to change the consequences of the third strike provision so that
California triples the base sentence otherwise available for offenders with no
strikes, makes prison mandatory, and possibly changes the good time release
effect. Zimring, supra note 128.
285. See Michael Vitiello, Punishment and Democracy: A Hard Look at
Three Strikes' Overblown Promises, 90 CAL. L. REv. 257 (2002) (book
review); Vitiello, supra note 270.
286. See Furillo, supra note 47; see also Gary Delsohn, Field Poll: Support
for Easing '3-Strikes', SACRAMENTO BEE, June 10, 2004; Field Poll I, supra
note 46. Delsohn cited how:
the Three Strikes Initiative question was posed to voters: "This
initiative would amend the three strikes law to require increased
sentences after a third offense only when the current conviction is for
a specified violent or serious felony. Only prior convictions for
specified violent or serious felonies would qualify for second and third
strike sentence increases, and allows for re-sentencing of persons if
prior convictions used to increase sentences no longer qualify as
violent or serious felonies. It also increases punishment for specified
sex crimes against children. Fiscal impact: unknown but significant
savings to the state ranging from several tens of millions to several
hundreds of millions of dollars annually. If the election were being
held today, would you vote YES or NO on this proposition?
Subsequently, the pollsters recognized the complexity of the questions
undercut the validity of their conclusions. See Walters, supra note 46. After
modifying the polling methodology to account for voter confusion, the poll
still showed that over two-thirds of likely voters supported the proposition.
See id.
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over the number of felons who could have secured their release and
the extent to which Proposition 66 would have applied to dangerous
felons explains its defeat. 287  While Proposition 66 would have
corrected many of Three Strikes' excesses, it failed to address the
broader concerns identified in this Report, specifically the helter-
skelter manner in which the legislature has enhanced criminal
punishments.
288
California's crisis is hardly unique. Other states have faced
budgetary constraints and considered how to maximize social
protection with finite prison resources. Our first recommendation is
that California appoint a blue ribbon commission to study reform.
Several states have adopted reforms that have not compromised
public safety but have saved taxpayers substantial sums. Several
states have experienced sharp declines in their crime rates without
adopting laws like Three Strikes. 89 As developed below, some have
created sentencing commissions and adopted sentencing guidelines
that have led to cost savings without risking public safety.290 A blue
287. See Furillo, supra note 47; Martin, supra note 271 at B5.
288. See discussion supra notes 79-96 and accompanying text.
289. Beres & Griffith, Analysis of AG's Report, supra note 4, at 127-30
(finding that Massachusetts and New York experienced drops in crime rates
similar to the decline in California, but did not enact three strikes statutes).
290. See discussion infra notes 307, 311-342 and accompanying text. In
considering the adoption of a sentencing commission, a blue ribbon
commission would need to determine whether allowing a sentencing judge to
make certain factual findings, resulting in enhanced sentences, is a violation of
the Sixth Amendment. As sentencing guidelines are currently administered, a
judge determines the appropriate sentence by making findings that may result
in a higher or lower sentence. During the 2003 term, a closely divided
Supreme Court found that a state law that gave a judge the responsibility for
making a finding that led to an increased prison sentence violated the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Blakely v. Washington, 124
S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The Court explicitly avoided expressing an opinion
whether the federal sentencing guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment. Id.
at 2538 n.9. A number of lower federal courts have held that the sentencing
guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Booker,
375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that application of the guidelines
violated the Sixth Amendment); United States v. Montgomery, No. 03-5256,
2004 WL 1562904 (6th Cir. July 14, 2004) (holding that Blakely means that
guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment). If the Court eventually holds that
the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to decide facts necessary to make a
proper sentencing decision, a guideline system may become unwieldy, adding
to length and complexity of jury trials. But it is premature to assess whether
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ribbon commission can survey existing reforms to assess what works
best for California.
California has used blue ribbon commissions in the past, with
some success. One such effort involved one of the primary drafters
of this report. 291 In 1995, the Chief Justice and the Judicial Council
created a blue ribbon commission to perform a comprehensive
evaluation of the state's jury system and to make recommendations
based on its findings.292 The Commission's success is evidenced by
the ongoing legal reforms based on its recommendations.2 93 The
Commission on Jury System Improvements is not the only successful
blue ribbon commission in California.
294
the Court will so hold and whether even with the added burden of fact-finding
by a jury guidelines are nonetheless worthwhile.
291. Professor J. Clark Kelso of the McGeorge School of Law, was a
reporter for the deliberations of the Jury System Improvement Commission
and the primary author of the its final report, FINAL REPORT OF THE BLUE
RIBBON COMMISSION ON JURY SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT (1996),
http://www.mcgeorge.edu/governnent_law_and_policy/publications/ccglp-pu
bs blue ribbon commission onjurysystemimprovement.pdf.
292. JUDICIAL CouNciL, FACT SHEET: JURY SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT
PROJECT (2004), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/
jurysys.pdf.
293. Many of the Commission's recommendations are realized through their
incorporation into the California Rules of Court and the California Standards
of Judicial Administration. Judicial Council of Cal., Task Force on Jury
System Improvements, www.courtinfo.ca.gov/jury/taskforce.html; see also
California Courts: Press Center: News Releases and Media Advisories, at
www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/newsreleases (providing access to court-
related news releases, which offer examples of successful commission
recommendations, including the plain-English civil jury instructions adopted
by the Judicial Council on July 16, 2003, the 2003 Burton Award for
Outstanding Reform, a national award honoring clear legal writing, presented
on June 25, 2003 to the Judicial Council for its role in the rewriting of the
California jury instructions, the implementation of the Blue Ribbon
Commission on Jury System Improvement's recommendations on October 19,
1998, and legislation enacted on September 24, 1998, which implements the
one-day, one-trial jury service system recommended by the Blue Ribbon
Commission on Jury System Improvement.
294. See, e.g., Cal. Comm'n on Inmate Population Mgmt., STATE OF CAL.,
Blue Ribbon Comm'n on Inmate Population Mgmt: FINAL REPORT (1990).
Some of the Commission's conclusions prompted new legislation. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1174; id. § 8050. The California Commission on Crime
Control and Violence Prevention's, Ounce of Prevention: Toward an
Understanding of the Causes of Violence: 1982 Final Report to the People of
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While not designated a blue ribbon commission, the Little
Hoover Commission shares some of the best features of a successful
commission. Created in 1962, the Little Hoover Commission is "a
bipartisan, independent body whose function is to promote
efficiency, effectiveness and economy in state programs." 295  A
number of its projects have been acclaimed.296 Most recently, it
published a highly regarded report critical of California's parole
system and provided a detailed plan for the implementation of
concrete improvements.
297
The success of any commission depends on its membership.
The composition of the Little Hoover Commission is mandated by
statute. The Commission consists of a balanced, bipartisan board
composed of five citizen members appointed by the governor, four
citizen members appointed by the legislature, two state senators, and
two assembly members.2 98 Once the commission decides on a topic
for study, the commission members select a subcommittee to
research a topic "by bringing key players together for discussions,
California (1983), also produced a legislative response. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 14110-14112, id. § 14114, id. § 14119.
295. Little Hoover Commission, Home Page, available at http://
www.lhc.ca.gov (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
296. Carla Rivera, The State Foster Care Report Urges Statewide Boss
Watchdog Agency Says 'Muddle of Authority' in California System Has
Proved Fatal to Children, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, at B9 (stating that "Child
Welfare Advocates applauded... [the Commission's 1999 foster care report]
for pressing the question of accountability"); Diane Wedner, California State
Panel Faults Housing Policies for Growing Crisis Real Estate, L.A. TIMES,
May 9, 2002, at C2 (noting that "housing advocates applauded the
commission's [housing] report"); Jenifer Warren, State Bid to Curb Youth
Violence Criticized Services: Anti-Crime Effort is Haphazard and
Underfunded, Report Says, Citing Studies Showing that Aggression is a
Learned Behavior, L.A. TIMES, June 13, 2001, at B1 (noting that crime
prevention advocates "welcomed" the Little Hoover Commission's youth
violence report); Carl Ingram, Legislature OKs Revival of Auditor General's
Office Government, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 1993, at A3 (calling the Little Hoover
Commission "a venerable research organization"); Virginia Ellis, Doctors'
Work in Nursing Homes Scored, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1989, at 3, 1989 WL
2,336,611 (noting that state regulators "applaud recommendations" from Little
Hoover Commission's report on treatment of elderly patients).
297. Little Hoover Commission, supra note 24, available at
http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/172/reportl72.pdf.
298. Little Hoover Commission, About the Commission, available at
http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/about.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
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contacting experts, reviewing academic literature and interviewing
those most closely affected by the target topic.' ' 299 Appointing the
major stakeholders is one important aspect of the success of any
commission. Allowing a full airing of the topic is the second
important component to success.
The recently appointed Deukmejian Commission demonstrates
the wisdom of using a blue ribbon commission. The Commission's
mandate involved pressing social issues, not easily resolved by the
legislature.300  The commission's report contains many sound
recommendations that it may have been possible to make only out of
the glare of public scrutiny, allowing for a meaningful, deliberative
process.
We propose that California adopt a blue ribbon commission to
study the possibility of the wholesale reform of California's criminal
sentencing scheme. As indicated above, prominent members of the
legal community are calling for similar studies at the national
level.3 0 California's system is, however, in even greater need of
repair. At a minimum, that commission should include members
of the judiciary and the criminal bar, both prosecutors and defense
lawyers. Efforts should be made to include prosecutors from
different communities, reflecting various attitudes across the state
towards the Three Strikes law. 303 Similarly, the commission should
299. Id.
300. Press Release, supra note 37, at www.schwarzenegger.com/en/news/
uptotheminute/news_upto en duke.__reform.asp?sec=news&subsec=uptothemi
nute.
301. Kennedy Speech, supra note 17, available at http://www.abanet.org/
media/kencomm/amkspeech03.html.
302. See, e.g., Turley Hearing, supra note 56, at 4 (discussing the looming
crisis posed by the increasing older prison population).
303. The San Diego District Attorney's office prosecutes Three Strikes cases
much more often than the San Francisco District Attorney's office. This
disparity may be due in part to the public's view of Three Strikes in each
respective area. Seventy-six percent of San Diego's voters supported the
Three Strikes initiative compared to just forty-three percent of San Francisco
voters. Samara Marion, Justice By Geography? A Study of San Diego
County's Three Strikes Sentencing Practices From July-December 1996, 11
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 29, 40-41 (1999). Frequency of use of Three Strikes
shows no correlation to the decline in crime rate. In fact, the crime rate in San
Francisco, the county least likely to invoke Three Strikes, declined much more
than the crime rate in Sacramento and Los Angeles Counties, where the law
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include judges from different parts of the state and should reflect the
real differences in judicial attitudes towards criminal sentencing. In
addition, the commission should include representatives from both
victims' rights groups and groups representing the families of those
serving long prison sentences. Finally, the commission should also
be comprised of scholars with expertise in criminal justice, including
both criminal law professors and criminologists.
30 4
The experts should have familiarity with empirical research
dealing with a number of criminal justice issues. For example, they
should be able to explain to the commission the impact of crime
legislation on the prison population. They should also be able to
explain the literature dealing with issues like recidivism. Lastly, they
should have expertise in alternatives to prison and be able to explain
successful rehabilitative programs and other community based
options, such as in-house detention.
30 5
One major reform that the commission should consider is the
adoption of a sentencing commission. While sentencing
commissions have produced mixed results,30 6 a number of state
systems have used the commission system successfully to solve
was invoked seven times more frequently than in San Francisco. See Males &
Macallair, supra note 4, at 67-68.
304. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 44-45 (Preliminary Draft No. 3,
2004) [hereinafter MPC PRELIMINARY DRAFT 3].
305. Part of the problem with our criminal justice system has been dramatic
pendulum swings. At one point, America was convinced that rehabilitation
was the key to reforming prisoners. When states soured on rehabilitation, they
abandoned efforts at rehabilitation on the erroneous view that nothing works.
Vitiello, supra note 68, at 1032. The pendulum swing towards incapacitation
has led to massive prison increases that most experts recognize are wasteful.
Many of the sentences are longer than necessary if our goal is protection of
society, and less expensive alternatives to such prison sentences are available.
ELLIOTr CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 164-72 (1998); Turley
Hearing, supra note 56, at 42-43. Today, criminal justice experts recognize
that society makes a mistake in treating all offenders as fungible. The
appropriate disposition depends on many different factors. See id. at 36. A
blue ribbon commission should have before it the full panoply of alternatives
to incarceration in prison.
306. See, e.g., Terence Dunworth & Charles D. Weisselberg, Felony Cases
And The Federal Courts: The Guidelines Experience, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 99,
100 (1992) (discussing criticism of the federal guidelines).
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problems like those California faces.30 7  The success of state
sentencing commissions has gotten the attention of the American
Law Institute. Primary among proposals for changes to the Model
Penal Code are several provisions advocating the adoption of
sentencing commissions.
30 8
Although the Model Penal Code has been widely acclaimed,30 9
its original sentencing provisions have been the least influential.310
The American Law Institute is currently drafting proposed changes
to those provisions. At the center of those changes is its proposal
that states adopt a sentencing commission.311 The working draft
includes a model sentencing commission and recommends specific
powers for the model commission. The success of several state
sentencing commissions has influenced the ALI to make those
recommendations.
312
North Carolina is among those states that have successfully
adopted a sentencing commission and guidelines. 313 In the 1970s
and 1980s, North Carolina operated under a determinate sentencing
scheme similar to that of California.314 North Carolina often led the
nation in incarceration rates3 15 and eventually became subject to a
307. See AM. LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE; SENTENCING § 6A
introductory cmt., at 40 (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 2002) [hereinafter MPC
PRELIMINARY DRAFr 1] (noting Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Washington,
Delaware, Oregon, Kansas, North Carolina, Virginia, and Ohio as states with
successful sentencing commissions).
308. See MODEL PENAL -CODE:. SENTENCING; REPORT 49-50 (2003)
[hereinafter MPC REPORT] (listing the "perceived advantages of the
commission-guideline systems").
309. See, e.g., Lance Liebman, Foreword to MPC REPORT, supra note 308 at
xi (2003) ("The Model Penal Code stands at the summit of the ALI's
intellectual achievements.").
310. See MPC REPORT, supra note 308, at 2-3.
311. Id.; MPC PRELIMINARY DRAFT 1, supra note 307; MODEL PENAL
CODE: SENTENCING (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2003); PRELIMINARY DRAFT 3,
supra note 304.
312. MPC PRELIMINARY DRAFT 1, supra note 307, § 6A introductory cmt.,
at 40-41; MPC REPORT, supra note 307, at 48-50.
313. MPC REPORT, supra note 307, at 48.
314. Reitz, supra note 53; see Ronald F. Wright, Counting the Cost of
Sentencing in North Carolina, 1980-2000, 29 CRIME & JUST. 39, 78 (2002)
(discussing the decentralization of North Carolina's "nominally determinate"
sentences under the Fair Sentencing Act from 1979 to 1988).
315. Wright, supra note 314, at 44.
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federal court order to reduce prison overcrowding. 316 The need to
create prison space led to both violent and non-violent offenders
serving only about 15% of their sentences.
317
North Carolina created a sentencing commission in 1990.318 It
began making recommendations for change over a two to three year
period that were then adopted by its legislature.319 The success of
the North Carolina commission relates to the two policy choices
under which it functioned. First, its recommendations had to fit
within existing correctional capacity, but the use of that capacity had
to be reprioritized.32 ° Second, sentences for serious or violent crimes
had to increase. 321  Those policies necessitated a third choice: to
achieve greater sentences for the worst felons, the commission had to
find offsetting reductions at the lower levels of crime severity.
322
Small reductions in punishment for lower level crimes free up
significant prison space for violent and serious prisoners because
lower level crimes are so much more numerous than violent and
serious felonies.
323
Pre and post-guideline comparisons demonstrate how North
Carolina implemented those policy choices. Prior to the guidelines,
North Carolina incarcerated 48 percent of those convicted of
316. Id. at 49-50 (discussing Small v. Martin (No. 85-987-CRT) (E.D.N.C.
April 3, 1989)); Carla Crowder, The Carolina Answer, ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb.
2, 1997, at Al (noting that "three separate suits alleg[ing] that confinement in
that state's prisons amounted to cruel and unusual punishment because of
overcrowding... were settled out of court. In order to comply with the
settlements while new prisons were getting built, the state started placing caps
on prison population"), http://www.doc.state.nc.us/news/ANMJ/anmj l.htm.
317. Reitz, supra note 53; see Wright, supra note 314, at 51 (noting that
some felons served less than 20% of their sentences, and misdemeanants
served only 6% of their sentences. Some felons with the most serious violent
offenses served up to 35% of their sentences, while those with the least serious
served only 19%).
318. N.C. SENTENCING & POLICY ADVISOR COMM'N, KAREN JONES &
TAWANDA ETHERIDGE, COMPENDIUM OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS
PROGRAMS IN NORTH CAROLINA: FISCAL YEAR 2002-2003, at 1 (2004),
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Documents/compendium2
002-2003.pdf.
319. MPC REPORT, supra note 308, at 82; Wright, supra note 314, at 75-76.
320. Wright, supra note 314, at 71.
321. See id. at 78.
322. Id. at 67.
323. Id. at 42.
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felonies.324 After adoption of the guidelines, the state incarcerated
between 28 percent and 34 percent of those convicted of felonies.
325
In addition, those found guilty of lower level property and drug
offenses who did serve time in prison served less time than they
would have without guidelines. By design, however, those
convicted of felonies at the top two levels of seriousness served
longer prison sentences than they would have without the
guidelines.327
North Carolina did not simply release to the community those
who would otherwise have gone to prison. The commission planned
that many of those offenders would be subject to a variety of
intermediate punishment programs-that is, community punishment
at a level of intensity greater than traditional probation. 328 Because
the commission projected the number of offenders subject to
intermediate punishment, programs and resources were available
once courts began diverting offenders from state prison.329 After
implementation of the guidelines, intermediate punishment went up
by 50 percent.
330
Some commentators are hesitant to endorse sentencing
commissions because of widespread criticism of the federal
sentencing guidelines that increased punishments and expanded the
prison population.33' The experience of most states with sentencing
324. Id. at 87.
325. Id.
326. Reitz, supra note 53.
327. Wright, supra note 314, at 87.
328. Id. at 54-55, 67, 70, 78.
329. MPC REPORT, supra note 308, at 82. The report noted:
When such planning is absent, as in the recent example of Proposition
36 in California (a voter initiative to divert many classes of drug
offenders from prison to drug treatment), large changes in sentencing
law can produce great dislocations when newly-sentenced offenders
appear in numbers that overwhelm the available program slots. At
best, states are in a position of playing catch-up when this occurs. At
worst, desired policy changes may collapse or be deemed a failure
because of inadequate implementation.
Id. Whatever one thinks of the policy wisdom of Proposition 36, the state
has been scrambling since it became effective to add required program
capacity. See also id. at 122.
330. Reitz, supra note 53.
331. MPC REPORT, supra note 308, at 115.
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commissions demonstrates that these are not necessarily a result of
adopting a commission scheme.
States that have adopted sentencing commissions have not
experienced the failures of the federal sentencing guideline
scheme. 332 Ten of the fifteen states that have had guidelines for at
least five years have experienced rates of incarceration growth lower
than the national average. 333 Some of the success in slowing down
increased prison populations in those states may be a result of
insulation of the commission from partisan politics.
334
Further, a choice to decrease the size of the prison population
does not necessarily lead to increased crime rates. For example,
Virginia's sentencing commission measured recidivism rates within
its offender population. Its study of those offenders resulted in the
creation of a risk assessment instrument for use by sentencing courts
and probation officers. 336 While a risk assessment instrument may
332. Id. at 121.
333. Reitz, supra note 53. It is also the case that there is no necessary
correlation between abolition of parole release and increased incarceration
growth. Of the nine states that adopted sentencing guidelines and abolished
parole release, all but one experienced growth of incarceration rates lower than
the national average. Of the six states that abolished parole release but did not
adopt sentencing guidelines, two of the six experienced growth of incarceration
rates lower than the national average. Four of the states that abolished parole
release and did not adopt sentencing guidelines experienced rates of
incarceration growth higher than the national average; one of these states was
California. Id.
334. Id.; see also Wright, supra note 314, at 84. Wright observed that in
North Carolina
[a] consensus settled into place: the sentencing structure, like the
sentencing commission itself, was perceived to be apolitical. It was a
planning device that allowed the state to link its sentencing aspirations
with the corrections resources at hand. This role as a credible and non-
partisan technical advisor allowed the Sentencing Commission and the
sentencing structure to remain intact even after the legislators who
created them were no longer in leadership roles.
Id.
335. Reitz, supra note 53; see also Michael Vitiello, supra note 126, at
1638-39 (stating that proponents of Three Strikes argue that it will lead to
reduced crime rates because of more incarceration. However, while the
correlation between increased incarceration and decreased crime rates has
"strong intuitive appeal," the correlation is difficult to verify).
336. Brian J. Ostrom et al., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, OFFENDER RISK
ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA: A THREE STAGE EVALUATION; PROCESS OF
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:903
lengthen incarceration or increase the prison population, Virginia's
goal was to identify the bottom 25 percent of offenders who would
otherwise have gone to jail under previous sentencing practice but
who are the lowest risk offenders.33 7 Those offenders would then be
placed in community punishment programs.
Virginia created a three-year pilot program to test the risk
assessment instrument.338 Judges consider the instrument a success.
They often agree with the recommendation generated by the
instrument and, as a result, have used it in about two-thirds of all
cases.
339
Sentencing guidelines and commissions may offer a number of
advantages over current practices. Creating a guideline grid
encourages those who create and implement it to think about
proportionality. 340 A typical grid, with an offender's criminal history
on the X-axis and the severity of the crime on the Y-axis, gives the
user a visual perspective on proportionality. 341  While federal
guidelines have reduced judicial discretion,342 a state may preserve
discretion by allowing downward departure from the recommended
sentence. The commission process allows reasonably accurate
forecasts of what will happen to a state's prison population once
guidelines go into effect.343 As a result, the state can make trade-offs
in light of existing budgetary constraints.
SENTENCE REFORM, EMPIRICAL STUDY OF DIVERSION & RECIDIVISM,
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 1 (2002), available at http://www.vcsc.state.va.us/
risk off rpt.pdf.
337. Id. at 9-10.
338. Id. at 1.
339. Id. at 3.
340. MPC PRELIMINARY DRAFT 3, supra note 304, § 6B.02 cmt., c at 130-
31.
341. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 208, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/RecidivismGeneral.pdf.
342. Reitz, supra note 53.
343. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other
States and the Federal Court: A Twenty Year Retrospective, 12 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 69, 75 (1999) (guideline systems "now possess by far the
best system-wide data on sentencing practices and correctional populations.");
Wright, supra note 314, at 84 (noting the accuracy of the North Carolina
Commission's prison population projections); MPC REPORT, supra note 308,
at 108-09.
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Yet another advantage of a commission guideline system is the
ability to monitor the way in which the guidelines are working in
fact. The commission may be responsible for assessing how the
guidelines are working and for recommending modifications where
necessary.344  Jurisdictions like Virginia and the United States
Sentencing Commission have conducted studies to assess risk
factors. For example, the federal commission has conducted a
sophisticated study to determine how well an offender's criminal
history (as used in the guidelines) predicts recidivism.
345
At least as implemented in some states, sentencing commissions
may lead to a rational allocation of prison resources. Commissions
can use data to reduce the risk to the public from releasing certain
classes of offenders.
VI. CONCLUSION
Several events indicate that now may be the time to
reform California's sentencing scheme. 346  The budget shortfall
demonstrates that the state must make sound choices between
competing institutions.347 The prison budget has expanded with little
responsible management. 348 The legislature has added sentencing
enhancements that are complicated but often unnecessary to assure
public safety.
349
Outside of California, influential voices have raised concerns
about the unchecked expansion of the prison population and the lack
of resources devoted to effective alternatives to prison.350 Concerns
about California's prison system and its ineffective parole system
344. Reitz, supra note 53.
345. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 208, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/Recidivism General.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, RECIDIVISM AND THE "FIRST OFFENDER," (2004),
http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/recidivismFirstOffender.pdf.
346. Supra notes 17, 34, 47 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 14-16, 34 and accompanying text.
348. See id.
349. See supra notes 79-96 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion
of sentencing enhancements.
350. KENNEDY REPORT, supra note 25, available at http://www.abanet.org/
media/kencomm/rep 121 a.pdf.
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have led to important recommendations for the state.35' The public
may have tired of draconian sentencing laws.
352
The drafters of this report think that the Deukmejian
Commission's Reforming California s Youth and Adult Correctional
System report is a good start for reforming California's prison
system. We urge further reforms. Three Strikes is an elephant in the
living room that cannot be ignored. It guarantees excessive prison
sentences both because the sentence does not reflect the culpability
of many third strike prisoners and because the length of those
sentences is unnecessary to guarantee public safety for offenders
whose careers may not have involved crimes of violence and whose
criminal careers were on the wane when they received their third
strike sentences. 353 Even beyond Three Strikes, California should
consider wholesale sentencing reform: the state has finite resources
and careful allocation of those resources should be its highest
priority. That allocation may result in longer sentences for some
offenders but shorter sentences or alternatives to prison for other
offenders.
354
Assessing effective sentencing policy should be the task of a
blue ribbon commission that can gain broad political support for
reform. 355 One major reform for the commission's consideration
should be the efficacy of adopting the sentencing reform commission
model that has been successful elsewhere. 3
56
351. Little Hoover Commission, supra note 24, available at
http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/l72/report172.pdf.
352. Supra notes 46, 272.
353. See supra Part III for a detailed discussion of Three Strikes and its
harsh effects.
354. Supra notes 276-279 and accompanying text.
355. Supra notes 301-308 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 307, 313-345 and accompanying text for a discussion
of successful sentencing commissions.
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